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BOTH Colonel Roosevelt and Victor Murdock have declared during the past few weeks that the Progressive party will nominate a candidate for the Presidency in 1916. This declaration may prove to be an aspiration rather than a prediction. Since the election of 1912 the party has steadily disintegrated, chiefly because a large majority of the people who voted for Mr. Roosevelt at the last election were not really progressive by conviction. Their devotion to the progressive program was not sufficiently single-minded and tenacious to prevent them from drifting back to their old personal and party allegiances at the first sign of reaction in public opinion. A considerable remnant nevertheless remains sincerely and stubbornly progressive. The majority of them realize that the best way to keep the party program alive is for Progressive voters to preserve an independence of the two older political parties. Even if they do not run a ticket of their own, they should make the leaders of the old parties unmistakably realize that a million or more of votes can be counted upon against a reactionary candidate. Such independence is more than ever necessary. Neither of the old parties can be trusted. The Republicans almost all over the Union have ceased even the pretence of being progressive. The Democrats have the advantage of abler and better leadership, but they have shown little interest as a party in some indispensable phases of a progressive political and social policy. A conscious, organized Progressive vote is still necessary as an instrument of social legislation and political reorganization—as the progressive members of the old parties will soon realize when such a vote ceases to exist.

EX-SENATOR ROOT has succeeded in attracting some public attention to the work of the Constitutional Convention by a drastic criticism of the existing government of the State of New York. He declares that it has been no more representative during the past thirty years than the government of Venezuela, and he is right. Not only in New York, but to a greater or smaller extent in other states, American state government has been a notorious and a flagrant failure. Mr. Root is also right in believing that a diminution in the number of elective officials and an increase in the power of the state administration as compared to that of the state legislature, will help to make state government more representative. The work which Mr. Root and his associates are doing at Albany in favor of the short ballot and administrative control of the state budget is one of the few encouraging aspects of a season otherwise devoid of constructive political work. They and only they have prevented the State Constitutional Convention from becoming an orgy of benighted partisanship, social reaction, and political ineptitude.

THE movement to oust Warden Osborne from Sing Sing Prison has become viciously aggressive. The underlying situation may be described briefly as follows: Mr. Osborne's superior officer is Superintendent Riley, an old and sickly man with a very creditable record as prison reformer. Mr. Osborne's real enemies are the old prison ring, the

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crowd whose graft has been stopped. They have worked on Superintendent Riley's vanity, and it seems that they have finally won over the support of such papers as the *Tribune* and the *Times*. Almost daily now some fresh story is published about Sing Sing, some "news" item played up to give the impression that under Mr. Osborne Sing Sing is a pleasure resort, a place of turmoil, of friction and anarchy. Thus public opinion is being prepared for the removal of Mr. Osborne, and the frustrating of one of the most important social experiments in the country. The agitators are the dispossessed grafters. The material upon which they work is the vanity of Superintendent Riley and the credulity of the public.

THE method of the attack on Mr. Osborne is a disgrace to American journalism. On Wednesday morning, for example, the New York *Tribune,* which has been friendly to Warden Osborne, published a solemn editorial saying that he must go. Vowing to heaven that it was pledged to prison reform, the *Tribune* stated that Mr. Osborne was bringing the "movement" into disrepute. It alleged "anarchy in prison administration." It did not stop to inquire whether the prison ring or the Warden had created the anarchy. It did not state one single concrete reason for removing Mr. Osborne. It did not study the record. It did not state that there have been no riots, less escapes, less drug traffic, and no corruption since Mr. Osborne went into office. It simply took the high moral ground of saying: "He must go for the good of the cause."

UNEMPLOYMENT in the United Kingdom continues to dwindle, and at the close of June fewer wage-earners were without work than at any time during the last thirty years. Even unemployables are able to get and hold a job, now that there is a real demand for their services. Pauperism also is disappearing not only in England and Ireland but also in Germany, Denmark and elsewhere. In other words, society, which in times of peace half supports millions of superfluous people, now finds these men and women necessary and therefore serviceable. During war our societies must forego the luxury of unemployment and of pauperism. They make greater drafts upon the power, will and courage of the people, and discover that many things are easy which were once thought impossible. Thus last year the governments of Europe were withholding necessary social services because these cost a few hundred thousand or even a few million dollars. The nations could not afford such sums. To-day the same nations are giving out from fifty to sixty million dollars a day for war, and taxes are readily paid and huge loans oversubscribed. All of which shows what a nation can do in a cause good or bad when it really tries.

A STRIKE in the garment trades has been averted. At the last moment the employers surrendered and signed the agreement proposed by the Mayor's council of arbitration. It is fortunate that the strike has been avoided, because if it had taken place it would have cost far more than it was worth. The issue, as always, was that of the right of discharge. The employers demanded that they should have full power to control the conditions of employees in their own shops, while the men insisted that to grant the employer such an unrestricted authority to discharge employees would be to intimidate the union men, destroy collective bargaining, and eventually to bring the agreement itself to an end. The task of establishing a permanent equilibrium between the rights of the employer and of the employee in this matter is, it is true, not easy, if indeed it is possible. But if such equilibrium cannot be achieved by patient negotiation between the two parties, it surely cannot be obtained by the cruder methods of industrial warfare. Matters in conflict between the two sides were whittled down to so fine a point that there remained not the slightest justification for a desperate struggle in which two thousand employers and sixty thousand wage earners were to be engaged, and through which both groups would lose much and neither gain anything. Only questions of prestige stood in the way of a pacific settlement, and now that a settlement has been reached it should not be difficult to keep a peace which both sides fundamentally desire.

> "THE fire smouldering in the forest of Europe was beginning to burst into flames. In vain did they try to put it out in one place: it only broke out in another: with gusts of smoke and a shower of sparks it swept from one point to another, burning the dry brushwood. Already in the East there were skirmishes as the prelude to the great war of the nations. All Europe, Europe that only yesterday was sceptical and apathetic, like a dead wood was swept by the flames. All men were possessed by the desire for battle . . . [In Italy] the atmosphere was no more serene. The great plague of national pride had spread there, and had transformed the Italian character. The Italians, whom Christophe had known to be indifferent and indolent, were now thinking of nothing but military glory, battle, conquests, Roman eagles flying over the sands of Libya: they believed they had returned to the time of the Emperors."

This is no mere excerpt from a jerry-built history of the first year of war, but a forecast formulated in 1912 by one of the keenest living critics of social movements, Romain Rolland. Alone, it would suf-

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fice to put the student of history on his guard against the easy view that just one nation wanted war and ran amuck among the pacific peoples. The war party was international; the war spirit blazed in every capital. Everybody wanted war; and everybody has it.

WHEN we say that everybody wanted war, we are indulging with moderation in poetic license. There is no evidence that the millions of small agriculturists wanted war. Nor is there any evidence that the masses of industrial workers, organized or unorganized, wanted it. There has been much idle questioning of the sincerity of the anti-military sentiments of the social democrats in the several European countries. They talked peace in time of peace, but in time of war they fight like old-fashioned patriots. If one's country is at war it must conquer or suffer the agonies of invasion; and invasion makes no discrimination between pacifists and militarists in its inevitable outrages. What is to the credit of the social democratic and labor parties is that in the decade preceding the war they played no part in the provocation of international distrust and hostility. The fomenters of war were the élite—the military officers, journalists, authors, politicians, lawyers, and the gilded youth who had emptied the cup of civil enjoyment and yearned for primitive emotions: a small minority, but a minority including all who govern and command, and many who write and agitate. The gravest charge that can lie against the manual working class is that they assented to the war after it became a fact. And what alternative had they?

IF there had been a lingering trace of primitive war lust in the working classes of Europe, their present experiences should be sufficient to extinguish it. A new meaning has been given to the phrase "wage slavery." A stupendous burden has been strapped upon the backs of workers, already sufficiently bent under the tasks of industrialism. It is generally admitted that the war has cost the workers of England, at least temporarily, much of the gains of a century of struggle. The Factory Acts have been relaxed; it is now a meritorious thing to get more work out of the laboring population, with or without more pay, and the law may not stand in the way of this vital interest of England—and this pecuniary interest of the employer. Overtime, at any rate in all industries providing munitions, is becoming ingrained in the scheme of operation. Rising prices nibble at the standard of life, and the whole public is quick to cry treason at any attempt on the part of the worker to secure a commensurate advance in wages. The system of free labor is yielding to a system of forced labor. In Germany and France forced labor is an established fact. Every able-bodied man is at the service of the authorities, for fighting or for work at their discretion. If a man is permitted to work in the factory instead of taking his place in the trenches, it is by grace of the government. Let a factory worker prove inefficient or recalcitrant, off with him to the firing-line. In our own days of forced labor we had a similar though less terrible mode of coercing a man into efficiency and obedience; if he would not coerce, we sold him down the river. These things the working classes will remember after the war. And they will realize that a political party directly representing their interests is not a mere symbol of utopian aspiration, but an essential bulwark of their welfare, their liberties and their lives. If the spirit of the workingman is not altogether broken by the war, peace will see a new efflorescence of the social democratic parties.

THE economic results of the present war offer many interesting points of comparison with the great international convulsion of the early nineteenth century. The Napoleonic wars, although on a much smaller scale than the present war, had the effect of dislocating society in a sense and to a degree that the far more sensitive and integrated society of to-day is not dislocated. Consider food prices. In England during the Napoleonic wars wheat fluctuated wildly, rising in 1801 to the tremendous sum of £5.19.6 per quarter, which meant famine. To-day Great Britain, producing only a small portion of her food, can dip her hand into the market basket of the world; and even so stupendous a phenomenon as the shutting off of the great Russian wheat supply works itself out by means of our international commerce. The result is that no nation hungers, but in London and Palermo, in Minneapolis and Rio Janeiro, everyone spends a little more for wheat, and the bread is spread thinner over the globe. No such overwhelming and revolutionary changes in the prices of great staple necessities take place to-day as took place a hundred years ago. Society, more highly sensitive but also more elastic, has protected itself through international commerce.

A GENERAL study of the influence of the war upon food prices in foreign countries is presented in the latest bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. This influence was curiously different in different places. The outbreak of war paralyzed commerce, trade and finance, and as the traffic stopped, some places were left with more food than they could possibly consume, while in other places the population could not be adequately fed. On the whole, however, there was

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throughout the length and breadth of Central and Western Europe a general rise in food prices, but not nearly so great a rise as might have been anticipated. Nor does it seem probable that a further increase in prices, at least as measured in gold, will result during a second or even a third year of war. The governments both of belligerent and of neutral countries have taken measures to prevent speculation in food, and agriculture and commerce have adapted themselves automatically to the exigencies of the war. Germany and Austria are utilizing every vacant lot for intensive cultivation, and as wheat rises in price in England and France, a greater area is sown in Argentine and the Canadian northwest. If the Dardanelles are captured by the Allies, the vast reservoir of Russian grain will flow into Western Europe. Food, in all likelihood, will be no scarcer on the planet this year than last, or, if somewhat scarcer, will be more equally distributed and more economically consumed. None of the belligerent nations is likely to be starved into submission.

ANY privately supported social agency has for its function to experiment and demonstrate. It can never put successful experiments into practice on a large scale, and should not if it could. This is the function of a publicly supported institution, which can seldom experiment, and lacks freedom and flexibility in demonstration. The School Lunch Committee of the Home and School League of Philadelphia has recently gone out of existence with the transference of its work to the public school authorities of the city. It has experimented for several years and has demonstrated the fact that school lunches may be self-supporting. As a result of its work the city now largely adopts this urgent school reform. Here is an admirable example of the way in which the private social agency should direct its activity toward abolishing the reason for its own existence.

"FINDING herself at war with half the world, England had claimed the right to search neutral vessels on the high seas for goods belonging to her enemies and to confiscate them wherever found; had also claimed the right to seize vessels trading with such of her enemies' ports as she had declared blockaded, whether she had actually blockaded them or not. . . . The northern states of Europe, headed by Russia, drew together in a league of 'Armed Neutrality,' determined to assert in force the doctrine that 'free ships make free goods,' . . ." This account, written some years ago by Professor Woodrow Wilson, of Princeton University, refers to the year 1780, and now happens to appear in the course of the serial republication of "A History of the American People." The passage proves that if history is trying to repeat itself, it is far from letter-perfect. There is ground, however, for the belief that the present world-drama is merely a garbled version of an old morality in which one of the sinners, at least, bore the same name. Is Mr. Wilson plagiarizing from history, or is history plagiarizing from Mr. Wilson?

British Orders and American Protests

ENGLAND'S new note is admirable in temper, and is in one respect satisfactory in substance. It opens the way for a consideration after the war is over of the legal controversies between the two countries by an international tribunal. But it does not make the British contention any more acceptable to the American government and public opinion. Justification for the Order-in-Council and in general for the British maritime policy during the war is based chiefly upon two grounds. It is defended as the legitimate application of existing principles of international law to new conditions, and as a fair reprisal against an enemy which has ignored civilized methods of waging war.

The first of these defenses is not without force; but how can the British government reasonably expect the United States to acquiesce in the second? The claim that the American government should accept unprotestingly an unprecedented extension of the principle of the blockade and an unprecedented stretching of the definition of contraband because Germany behaved badly in Belgium, implies a revolutionary change in the attitude and responsibilities of neutrals toward belligerents. It implies that neutrals should pass judgment on the issues and controversies arising among belligerents and adapt its own commercial policy to the results of such a verdict. The NEW REPUBLIC trusts that in the future neutrals will have the courage to assume this very attitude and responsibility. But when such a responsibility is assumed it would scarcely be effective unless it were shared by an organized group of neutrals. If it were assumed now by our country, it could be construed by Germany as an unfriendly act. Great Britain, by excusing her own conduct as a measure of retaliation and by presumably expecting us to consent to it on that ground, is practically asking the United States to take sides against Germany. We are obliged to reject this English plea in order to have a valid defense against any German complaints. The American government has refused to admit in its

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negotiations with Germany that the British Order-in-Council constitutes sufficient excuse for the German violation of the law of visit and search. It must refuse to admit in its negotiations with Great Britain that alleged German atrocities in Belgium constitute a sufficient excuse for an unprecedented extension of belligerent power over neutral commerce.

The policy of Great Britain makes the situation of the sympathizers with the Allies in the United States very difficult. The United States is a nation whose inhabitants are derived from many countries and races. It contains many millions of people of German blood. These people are naturally very desirous that the resources of their adopted country should not be used in a manner injurious to their blood relations in Germany. It so happens, however, that they can be used in a manner very harmful to Germany without any violation of technical neutrality. The Allies can draw military supplies from this country to an extent which during the coming year may count decisively in their favor. The Germans naturally object to the assistance which the Allies are obtaining from the United States, but they would not have been in a position to stir up an effective counter agitation as long as Great Britain was respectful of the restricted rights of trade which the pre-existing body of law permitted Germans and Americans to enjoy. Now, however, German-Americans are in a position to stir up an effective counter agitation. They can ask the good-natured American citizen of the Middle West whether he wishes to stand for an application of international law which enables the Allies to buy ammunition in the United States but prevents the Germans from obtaining food and clothing for women and children. They can urge upon the Southerner that the most effective way to obtain a sale for his cotton in Germany is to force Great Britain to modify her commercial policy by the threat of an embargo on military supplies. Such a threat would be resented in England, but by making it the United States would merely be itself following the example of reprisal which is so popular with Great Britain and Germany.

The other justification urged by the British government for the Order-in-Council has more force. The law of nations has always admitted the general right of a belligerent with control of the seas to suppress any commerce of military advantage to its enemy. The doctrine has been applied in the past, subject to definite restrictions. If a blockade were established, it was supposed to be effective, to be impartial and to have no more than a certain radius of action around specified ports. If a blockade were not established, only that part of a belligerent's trade destined to feed, equip or supply its armed forces was subject to interference. Great Britain claims that these restrictions have ceased to hold, because a perfectly effective blockade can be established without enclosing specified ports, and because any commerce with a nation in arms is of military advantage to that nation. A blockade, in order to be legitimate, has only to be effective.

The technical answer is that the British blockade is not effective, because it does not attempt to stop German trade with Norway, Sweden, and Denmark in the Baltic, and consequently it is not impartial. As the New York *World* says, it is not so much a blockade of Germany as against the United States. But the real strength of the American case does not rest upon these technical rights. They are only the pretext. Such rights derive their importance not from their intrinsic value, but because they are the one means of bringing home to Great Britain some sense of international responsibility in the exercise of her sea power. The kind of power which Great Britain is claiming is of enormous reach and effect. It makes the British navy the veritable ruler of the seas, subject only to the restrictions which a well-disposed British government is willing to impose on its fleet commanders. Such being the British assumption of power, neutrals must cling to their prescriptive rights. If only the old limitations on the exercise of that power can be kept alive, nations which do not expect to control the seas will have a good legal excuse for insisting that Great Britain either share this great power with other nations, or exercise it in some constitutional way. That is the reason why the American government has protested and must continue to protest against the Order-in-Council.

The Freedom of the Seas

"THE Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government . . . have long stood together in urging the very principles upon which the Government of the United States now so solemnly insists. They are contending for the freedom of the seas. The Government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom, from whatever quarter violated without compromise and at any cost."

The foregoing passage from the last American note to Germany is strong and clear. The freedom of the seas is a brave phrase. If the American nation is going to "contend" for the good of any cause, it could not select a more fruitful one than the "freedom of the seas." The deliverance of mankind from all kinds of frustration and oppression will in part depend upon the conversion of the "freedom of the seas" from a sounding phrase into a sober and definite political achievement.

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Unfortunately, like other sounding phrases it lends itself to divergent interpretations. All three parties to the present controversy have attempted to appropriate it. The Englishmen who discourse learnedly and appreciatively about the British Empire make its very foundations consist of something which they call the "freedom of the seas." The Germans, on the other hand, are proclaiming that the present war, instead of being, as they too quickly assumed in the beginning, a fight of German civilization against Russian barbarism, is in reality a fight against the tyranny which Britannia exercises over the waves. The American government, finally, is "contending" for still another kind of maritime freedom—the freedom to trade and travel on the high seas in time of war, subject only to those regulations which have hitherto been admitted by the common consent of civilized nations to be reasonable and just.

None of these interpretations of the phrase is wholly satisfactory. The freedom of the seas, if it ever becomes a veritable accomplishment, will be something different from British maritime sovereignty, German maritime anarchy, or the complicated compromise between despotism and order which is called international law. If the American government intends to work effectively for maritime freedom, it will have to make the franchise claimed by neutral commerce in time of war mean something more than the meagre collection of rights which neutrals have painfully won from belligerents, and which the belligerents are now combining to extinguish. No less will it have to dissociate maritime freedom from mere rebellion against the interference by sea power with commerce during war. What then should it mean?

Ever since the art of navigation was matured and piracy abolished, the seas have been free to the ships of all nations in time of peace; but this freedom has been precarious, because it was liable to interruption in time of war. The position of every nation which depended to a considerable extent for its subsistence upon foreign commerce was rendered insecure because its means of livelihood could be cut off completely by an enemy with a fleet, or partially as the consequence of war among other nations. International law, so far from providing a remedy for this insecurity, expressly sanctioned it. Belligerents had always possessed the general right to put a stop to sea-borne commerce which might be of military help to their enemies. The manner in which this right could be exercised was regulated, but the regulations were ambiguous and did not embody effectively any positive counter principle—such, for instance, as the intrinsic superiority of the occupations of peace to those of war. During hostilities the interests of the nation which controlled the sea were paramount over the interests of the peaceful traders. International law had been written by sea power in the interest of its own preponderance.

How are the seas to be really freed? In the past Americans have usually answered this question as the Germans are answering it now. They have contended that a navy during war should be used only to fight other navies or to convoy troops. Commerce of all kinds, including even that in munitions of war, should not be embarrassed by belligerent interference. Such is the obvious and traditional meaning of the freedom of the seas, but because it is obvious and traditional it should not be accepted uncritically. As a matter of fact it would be a fatal mistake for the American nation to contend for any such doctrine of freedom. The phrase does not necessarily imply complete freedom of trading on the seas, any more than freedom of commerce among the states implies the emancipation of domestic commerce from all governmental interference. National commerce has always been regulated in what was supposed to be the national interest. International commerce is equally in need of regulation in international interest. The all-important public interest for the benefit of which it should be regulated is, of course, that of international security and peace.

Unrestricted freedom of trading on the high seas would not contribute to international security and peace. Its effect would be enormously to improve the strategic position of military power on land as compared to military power on sea. By means of such an interpretation of maritime freedom a preponderant land power could make the whole world contribute to its military efficiency and success; and if the whole world agreed, it would be a credulous and a mercenary world. Military power on land is the indispensable instrument of aggressive political purposes. It has always constituted and always will constitute the gravest threat to international peace and the liberty of weaker nations. Sea power, on the other hand, is comparatively inoffensive. Not only can it not be used effectively for aggressive purposes, except in so far as it is supported by an army, but its function in the history of Europe has been that of guarding the weaker nations against attack by the strongest contemporary army. English sea power was used to check the aggression of the Spain of Philip II, and the France of Louis XIV and of Napoleon I. As long as militarism continues to be a serious danger, peaceful neutral nations, by insisting on the emancipation of commerce from interference by sea power, would be adopting a suicidal policy.

Germany flourishes the principle of freedom without control because, as the possessor of the

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most effective existing army, she would gain enormously from complete freedom of commercial intercourse during war. Neutral trading nations cannot afford to become her accomplices or the accomplices of any other dominant land power. They cannot permit the commerce of the world to enter into an alliance with militarism. International commerce needs an international justification. The greatest care must and should be exercised to make it serve something more than the national welfare. If adapted to such a service it will be entitled to the right and the power to move freely; but if the spokesman of commerce permit it to be made the instrument of aggressive militarism, they will be allowing the indispensable medium of international intercourse to be used to prevent any stable international order. Neutrals cannot claim the right to trade with all nations at all times irrespective of the results of such traffic. The assumption of such a position by the United States would mean the sacrifice of public interests for the benefit of a kind of nationalistic commercial privateering. The abettors of the traffic would be mere exploiters. They would deprive trade among nations of any standard of public responsibility.

The exercise of some control over commerce during war cannot be abandoned. It is necessary for the security of maritime and other kinds of freedom during peace. The only question is, how and by whom shall the control be exercised? It is now being exercised by Great Britain because she possesses a preponderant navy. Rather than that the control should be emasculated, Great Britain should be allowed to continue its exercise. But Englishmen must recognize that the world will not submit to the indefinite perpetuation of an exclusively British dominion of the seas. Other nations besides Germany will dispute British control, in case they are not permitted to share its responsibility and costs. If a preponderant navy is to retain its power of life and death over commerce, it can only be as the agent of international police regulation.

In the long run such an essentially international function must be placed under international control. The power attaching to its exercise has enormously increased during the present war, because certain kinds of commerce which were formerly of little benefit to a belligerent have now become of substantial benefit. This power will continue to increase in proportion to the improvement in national economic organization and the expansion of international commerce. It will become too great a power to be restricted to any one nation. It will be too great a burden to be carried by any one nation, unless it should be converted into a source of illegitimate profit. Great Britain will need assistance, and as soon as she realizes the need of assistance, the organization of an international maritime sovereignty will become a matter of practical statesmanship. How far this international sea power will have to use a navy as its instrument, how far it can substitute for a navy commercial weapons, such as non-intercourse, and what kind of a legal system will result from international control, are important questions which need not concern us here. The thing to realize is that freedom on the seas, like freedom on land, cannot exist in the absence of control. It must be associated with an international maritime order contrived in the interest of the world's peace.

Mexican Reconstruction

IN the whole tangle of Mexican affairs one factor has always been clear. This was that the United States must take part in the reconstruction. Our government brought about Huerta's downfall, and by its action it shaped events so that no one of the revolutionary factions could secure power without our aid. For Carranza or Villa to succeed they must have loans and munitions; there must be an embargo on munitions to all counter-revolutionists. But these aids imply recognition by the United States. Without it the money needed to reconstruct Mexico could not be obtained. And when it was obtained, the United States would have to be ready to back up the Mexican government which it had created. However much we may use phrases to save Mexican pride, the blunt reality is that the United States, with its diplomatic, economic and military force, is the only power that can now make possible a real government in Mexico. Any policy of "hands off" and "watchful waiting" is really a decree that the fighting shall continue.

The President's new policy announced in Tuesday's papers is based on a recognition of these facts. It does not imply a desire to restore the old Cientificos; it is not actuated simply by the intention to safeguard foreign interests; it is not inspired with the hope that Mexico can be turned now into a happy democracy of peasant proprietors. The justification of Mr. Wilson's action is that the fighting in Mexico has ceased to be revolutionary, and has become an aimless and chronic devastation; that the reforms which Mexico requires cannot be achieved by guerilla war; that a restoration of political methods is needed before Mexico can begin to deal with her problems; that some kind of order must be established before the end of the war in Europe.

The President clearly intends to work through the Mexican people. He does not propose to go in there and "clean them up." His plan is to select some prominent Mexican associated with the Ma-

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dero government, and create out of him a provisional executive. This man will have behind him the power of the United States, and his opponents will be hampered as much as possible by the United States. He will secure recognition, which means that he will be able to borrow money. It is announced that American interests are ready to help him with loans. This should enable him to organize and equip an army. At the same time by a thoroughgoing embargo the United States can strangle the power of any generals who stand out against him.

This will commit us very deeply. It may mean at some future time actual military intervention to bolster this man up. It will be at all times an active responsibility for the way he conducts himself. Our government will have to be consulted by him, and because of the power it will wield to make or unmake him its influence will be very great. Our responsibility will not end with the establishment of temporary "law and order." For any permanent progress in Mexico there must be vast social and administrative reforms, and our pressure will have to be continuous not only upon the provisional President, but on his successor when he is elected. We may have to lend him experts to reorganize Mexican revenues, and possibly to supervise them.

It is a policy which, judged by the standards of European diplomacy in let us say Morocco, would mean in the end a protectorate of Mexico. But nothing is clearer than that the overwhelming mass of the American people have no imperial ambitions in Mexico. They intervene in Mexico not because they like to, but because the only choice they have is between European and American intervention. Above all, no important section of our people desires territorial conquest.

To guarantee the honesty of our intentions, which Mexican patriots cannot help suspecting, the President is working to make his policy a Pan-American one. South and Central American States are to foster the policy in order to convince the Mexican that it is not mere gringo insolence. The states of their own language and culture are to act as moral guarantors. It is tempting to think of the larger meaning of such Pan-American action. But it is well not to overestimate it. The cost and responsibility of the task will fall upon us. Nevertheless the association should prove an excellent object lesson in international cooperation. It should help to allay the fear of the United States which is so current in Latin-America. It should help to give us a new respect for our Continental neighbors. It should give at least a small example to the world of the fact that when police work is necessary it is an international responsibility and not an excuse for aggression.

In working out the policy we must expect many defeats. There will have to be much experiment, and a great readiness to abandon any specific proposal. For the President has announced a line of action whose success depends altogether on the ingenuity and resourcefulness of American diplomacy. It will require subtlety, for the chief faction in the situation is the psychology of the Mexican people. It will require the realism of thought which recognizes that Mexico is not an imitation of the United States, and constant invention to meet unforeseen difficulties. It requires suppleness, skill, humility, tact, and a large good humor.

The Passing of British Gold

BRITISH gold for a hundred and fifty years has stood almost as a synonym of international finance. The British financial dominion has been less subject to challenge than the British dominion of the seas. This financial dominion had come to be tacitly accepted in all our calculations in world economics, and only now when signs appear of its approaching dissolution do we pause to consider what a remarkable thing it really is. From every quarter of the world men have been resorting to London with all conceivable projects of mutual enrichment. In Britain was to be found capital for every need, apparently in inexhaustible supply. Enticing opportunities in America, Asia, Africa, and even in old Europe, set up an active competition for the attention of the British capitalist. It was his rôle to judge and choose, to prescribe and command. He was absolute sovereign, regally rewarded for the exercise of his power. And he used his power worthily. In the midst of wildcat enterprises in undeveloped regions there used to appear exceptional businesses, solid, well managed, honorable. They were built upon British gold. In many and many a mining district, after the era of the feverish prospector and the shifty adventurer peddling his dreams among the unwary, order and stability have their appearance under powerful companies able to undertake great works and wait calmly for returns. The reservoir of British gold had been tapped.

England has long been rich, but this fact alone does not explain her financial hegemony. We have more wealth than England—perhaps twice as much—yet we still rank financially as a second-rate power. It is the kind of wealth rather than its quantity that is of primary significance. We have a hundred and fifty billions, but almost all of it is in forms precluding international investment. Our wealth is bound to the soil, while that of England has been free. Until very recent times we have

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never had anything to compare with England's flow of new capital-seeking investment—a billion and a half a year. How we gaped a few years ago over a billion-dollar corporation, half paper. For a long time we doubted that our financial reservoir was deep enough to float it. British thrift of one year would have floated three United States Steel Corporations.

The stream of new capital, source of British financial power, has been flowing so long that it looks to the world almost like a constant force of nature. In fact, however, it is the product of economic and social forces that are easily susceptible of modification in the course of history. One-half of the British private income flows into the pockets of the well-to-do and rich. The world's most attractive investment opportunities present themselves to the members of these classes who are inclined to add to their capital; and the British social tradition is conducive to ambitions of fortune building. The industrial power of the country also lends its aid to international investment. The foreign or colonial promoter who will buy his equipment in England will find powerful influences helping to create a market for his shares. Thus financial, industrial and social forces have conspired to consolidate and extend the international power of British gold. But let equalitarian forces make head, let social ambition divorce itself from money, let the flow of investment opportunities be checked, and the British financial dominion is shaken. It is a delicately balanced mechanism, ill adapted to meet shocks. And now it has encountered the shock of a great war.

A hundred years ago British finance encountered Napoleon, and emerged from the struggle more powerful than ever. The French war consumed, in its more desperate stages, one-third of the entire national income; the present war consumes the equivalent of one-half the national income, but the drain can hardly last through so long a period as that of the Napoleonic wars. But the international situation is not the same as it was a hundred years ago. Then England was industrially supreme, and could recoup her losses through export trade. This supremacy was lost two decades ago and can never be recovered. A hundred years ago there was no financial market in the world to take the place of London. Investment had to wait upon British accumulation. To-day it is quite possible for international investment to find new channels.

In one year of war Great Britain has used up the possible accumulations of three years of peace. No foreign enterprises are being floated in England, nor will flotations be resumed while the war lasts and for a considerable period after it closes. If the war drags out, the international promoter will lose the habit of resorting to the British financial market. His tempting opportunities will be offered elsewhere; financial institutions will organize themselves to meet the need. The new financial markets will work hand in hand with an industry competing with the British. Capital in England will be forced to assume new burdens of taxation. It is not improbable that the British will emerge from the war with a new debt of ten billions of dollars. In that case half a billion dollars will be added to the annual budget—five per cent of the taxable income of the nation, and the taxpayers were already chafing under their burdens before the war. Can the burden be shifted to the classes not now subject to income tax? Hardly; it is more probable that with peace the working class will be even more insistent than before upon a higher standard of living and improved welfare institutions. And it is further probable that the lower income classes will strive more vigorously for a drastic application of the progressive principle of taxation. The rich can best bear the burden.

British financial power has rested upon the flow of new investment capital. While the war lasts this flow will be wholly diverted from its customary uses. When the war is over much of the lost ground may be regained, if the flow of new capital is not impaired. But capital will be taxed as never before, and the rising tide of working class demands will menace the large incomes, the most prolific source of savings. Britain will doubtless become again an important financial market, as France, Belgium and Holland were important financial markets before the war. But British gold, as financial power *par excellence,* has already been greatly weakened. If the war continues through years, British finance will be forced to a secondary rank in the world's affairs.

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EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY — WALTER LIPPMANN
PHILIP LITTELL — FRANCIS HACKETT
WALTER E. WEYL — CHARLOTTE RUDYARD

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The Meaning of It

DURING the past year many attempts have been made to justify, to judge, and to explain the war. It has been justified by all the fighting nations primarily as a necessary measure of self-defence, and secondarily as a distressing but still remunerative method of accomplishing desirable political purposes. It has been judged and condemned by pacifists as so hideous a calamity and so absolute an evil that its occurrence should have been avoided and its cessation should now be purchased at any necessary cost.

Besides being justified under the specific circumstances and condemned under all circumstances, it has also been approved on equally general grounds. Quite apart from the desirable political purposes which may be accomplished by the war, it is declared to be in itself a useful moral discipline and experience—a drastic but indispensable means of blasting people away from the routine, the apprehensions, and the pretentious artificialities of a protected modern life into a higher region of dangerous but stimulating realities. Finally it has been explained by all manner of formulas, some of which trace it to one cause and some to another, but all of which agree in making conscious and distinguishable economic and political forces chiefly responsible for its hateful intrusion. The majority of people, when they think about the war, think about it in terms of these justifications, judgments and explanations.

The sombre anniversary of the outbreak of hostilities has recently been made the pretext for the revival of these formulas, and their re-emphasis. They have been repeated with as much conviction as ever, but after the events and the recriminations of the past year they should not be received by Americans with as much hospitality. We confess to an increasing scepticism. Our scepticism is not based merely on the mutually destructive nature of the several justifications, judgments and explanations. Many of the justifications are so manifestly war-cries, and many of the judgments and explanations betray so clearly the prepossessions of their advocates that disinterested people have always written them down rather as appeals by partisans to the wills of their fellow-countrymen than to the reason of foreigners. Our scepticism concerns not only this palpable and necessary propaganda, but much of the reasoning and many of the assumptions which underlie the less essentially controversial verdicts and formulas.

The assumption is that the materials already exist for a sufficiently complete understanding of the causes of the war, a sufficiently exact prediction of the results of victory by either of the two contending groups of powers, and a sufficiently final verdict upon its issues. We doubt this assumption. The war escapes anything but very partial and tentative explanations because its causes are obscure, complex, and too much still in the making. It defies finality of judgment because its deeper issues have not as yet been sufficiently worked out in the political experience of mankind. At a time and on an occasion in which intellectual certitudes and moral dogmatisms are so useful to the fighting nations, those who do not have to fight should guard against the excusable presumption of their less fortunate brethren. They should above all seek to understand this war, but they may not pretend to understand too much of it. In relation to such a mysterious, appalling and immitigable fact, wisdom begins with humility.

Consider the formula into which Englishmen and Frenchmen attempt to jam the meaning of the war. They declare that in its essential aspect the war consists of a fight between autocratic militaristic aggression, as represented by Austria-Hungary and Germany, and inoffensive self-governing democracy, as represented by the western Powers. There is truth in this formula, so much truth that American sympathy with the Allies is sufficiently justified. The headstrong career of German militarist nationalism requires to be checked; and in case there were any serious danger of its triumph, other democratic nations, in addition to those engaged in the conflict, would have a certain obligation to join the combination in restraint of Germany. But the opponents of Germany are not and never have been an exclusively defensive combination. All of them have certain aggressive designs which in case they are victorious will partly determine the resulting settlement. These designs are explained and defended either as legitimate national ambitions or as precautionary measures necessary to prevent a repetition of the German attack. The realization of some of them would probably contribute to European peace and stability, but the realization of others would with equal probability provoke and justify future unrest. They certainly cannot be defended as the necessary part of a democratic reorganization in Europe; and this statement would be conspicuously true of any attempt to put Germany in irons as a perpetual suspect. If the Allies organize and plan merely to prevent Germany from repeating the attack, the result will inevitably be the growth within their own

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borders of aggressive militarism. Until we remark a more active disposition on the part of the western Powers to discourage their own militarists and to avoid discouraging democracy in Germany, we shall remain sceptical of the complete truth of their favorite formula.

If we cannot acquiesce in the formulas which seem to consecrate the war, neither can we acquiesce in unqualified condemnation of it. We do not know enough to draw such an indictment. The voluntary sacrifice by so many million men of the affections, associations and ambitions which make up the stuff of their personal lives, their voluntary acceptance of the certainty of suffering and the strong probability of death, imposes itself on the imagination and subdues the judgment. Rather silence than a sermon. If these men are murderous and insensate as the invectives of the dogmatic pacifists imply, mankind must be either culpable or crazy. As sincere democrats we reject the alternative. Democratic pacifists try to escape from it by attributing the war to secret diplomacy, the lack of woman suffrage, or some other defect in democratic organization; but the responsibility for this war must be placed where it belongs—on the shoulders of civilized mankind, whether in Europe or America. So colossal a calamity, such a ghastly accretion of premature death and frustrated life, has already earned something of the royal prerogative. Before it can be conclusively condemned, before its repetition can be prevented and its results controlled, it must be better, very much better, understood.

A prudently sceptical attitude towards the justifications and judgments passed upon the present war must not be confused with indifferentism. It is the expression of a necessary democratic trust in human nature and a necessary democratic distrust of presumptuous intellectual and moral conclusions. The wise democrat will combine an imperturbable faith in the adequacy and the authenticity of a democratic solution with a stubborn preference for tentative approaches towards the goal, and an equally stubborn disposition to submit all results and all pretensions to scrutiny. He does not forego judgment; he partly suspends it in the expectation of additional experience and in the interest of a more ruthless inquisition. In the meantime he will take the risk of partial judgments. He can condemn the violation of Belgium without reprobating the culprits as international outlaws or erecting their opponents into immaculate defenders of the faith. He can deplore the results of the intense, calculated, scientific and idealistic nationalism of Germany without abandoning the hope that the greatest benefit from the war will not be a German loss of power but a German increase of experience. His doubts as to the pretensions of dogmatic pacifism would be entirely compatible with a profound conviction that even a decent standard of civilization must bring with it the extinction of war. Yet he would not expect to extinguish war among nations until the enlightened conscience of mankind had done very much more to justify peace within national limits. The establishment of a forced and premature international order, instead of lessening the danger of war might actually provoke convulsive reaction and violent repression. Finally he would not be disconcerted by the disapproval of either national or anti-national fanatics. He would be consoled by the assurance that impatient fanaticism is the most dangerous enemy both of the world's peace and of democratic liberalism.

An attitude of judicious scepticism brings with it important practical consequences. In the eyes of most Englishmen and many Americans the United States is recreant to the cause of liberalism, because it will not hasten into the war on the side of the Allies. The American nation need acknowledge no such obligation, unless, perhaps, the western Powers were in danger of being crushed by Germany. The cause of liberalism would be perverted and impoverished by being subordinated to the necessities of the anti-German combination. We Americans are entitled to testify to democracy in our own way and according to our own traditions. The special problem of the western Powers is the immensely difficult and dubious one of making a world war contribute to permanent pacification. Our special problem is that of making neutral abstention from war contribute to the same end.

If we are forced into the war we ought not to lose sight of our special work. Instead of assuming the obligations of a full-fledged partnership with nations so heavily in debt to their own past as are the Allies, our participation should be made on some basis of limited liability. We should not risk so many of our eggs in a basket over which we have such slight control. If we remain neutral our work as a neutral should consist in making neutrality articulate and discriminate. If we become a belligerent we should adapt our belligerency to the attainment of our own special purposes, and we should not let it prevent us from continuing disinterested. The fact that one great democratic nation has remained disinterested and detached will be of peculiar value when the war is over. As a consequence of not getting too much involved in the treaty of peace, which will be determined by a balance of forces rather than the authority of ideas, the United States will have the opportunity of being far more influential during the subsequent period of reconstruction. H. C.

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The Unbroken Chain

PART II

CEZANNE had said, "All nature is modelled either like a cone, a sphere or a cylinder." That phrase germinated in the minds of certain young French painters. Every year since the beginning of the century marks the evolution of painting "beyond the imitation of nature" toward "a coloured mathematics of things," culminating in artists who claim to suggest everything by simple inflexions of lines and colors, indefinite relations between straight and curved lines, between warm tones and cold, without the slightest concern for making them like any visible object; for "the purpose of the artist is to divest things of their commonplace appearance and to mould reality in the image of the spirit." This is the triumph of subjectivism: "A purely lyric appreciation of reality," but a singularly austere and rationalized lyricism, a sort of architecture or music of rhythms aiming to evoke "the plastic essence of the world" by combinations of angles, successions of intervals and geometric equations.

Whatever the value of this group of artists may be—and it is more advisable to judge them by their two leaders Picasso[1] and Bracque than by the rest of their following where too many dubious recruits have slipped in—nevertheless it is easier to ridicule their theories than to avoid recognizing the theories themselves as another step forward along the road French art has followed for half a century. The most recent manifesto of the cubists makes no pretense of denying their origin. They claim descent not only from Cezanne and the impressionists but from Courbet and Manet, and like Cezanne, they also claim to have transcended the superficial reality of Courbet, with a profounder reality. But between Cezanne and the impressionists they recognize only a difference of degree. They institute "a successive impressionism" which, by rational methods, will give form to what is permanent and immutable in the multifarious flux of life. Whether their purpose has been achieved is another matter. I shall not attempt to solve the riddle. But I venture to say that in their intentions at least these strange dreamers, these painter geometricians, are conforming to the logic of pictorial evolution; they are not, as is so commonly said, the expression of whim, bluff or accident. The rigorous necessity which directs human intelligence has evoked them at their destined moment in the history of art.

What then is the cause of this antagonism which since Delacroix has continually separated the public from the most original masters of painting? Why, since Manet, has the antagonism grown constantly more intense?

It is primarily the result of one event which has overturned occidental tradition and inoculated it with foreign virus. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, France more than once had recourse to the literature, painting and music of other countries. She profited in doing so, and thereby found a means of renewing her energies. But at any rate she turned only to her immediate neighbors. Delacroix sought fresh impetus in the English painters. But however different the mentality of the two races, the difference is a matter of subtleties. Yet even Delacroix was already attracted to the Orient. Presently Manet, as Huysmans remarked, "halted before the albums of Japan." Manet, it is said, while traveling in Holland, found a Japanese print at one of his hosts', an incident which marked the beginning of his revolution. Van Gogh's passion for the Japanese became an idolatrous cult. Their influence is visible in his first paintings of Arles and the drawings he made in their manner with a reed pen. And he boasts somewhere of continuing the great Japanese tradition more faithfully than the Japanese themselves. Gaugin and Pissaro are two exotics, one half Peruvian, the other a West Indian creole. Gaugin bored himself to extinction under the sky of France, he was homesick for tropical sunlight. He emigrated suddenly the first time to Martinique, the second time to Tahiti, and finally to the Marquis Islands where he died. He could find fitful serenity only among the Maoris. He offsets Greek standards with the ideals of Persians and Cambodians. Matisse interrogates the barbaric idol-makers of Polynesia and the Sudan, Picasso is enthusiastic over negro artists, whom he ranks higher than the Egyptians. "Polynesian or Dahomian idols seem essentially rational to him." He analyzes them constantly. Monstrous winds blowing from the ends of the earth invade the minds of occidental painters. Is it surprising that western races no longer recognize their sons?

But the misunderstanding has even more fundamental causes. The springs of art have not merely touched new sources, the springs themselves have been displaced. As a result of the prodigious hyper-

[1] For an account of the intellectual crisis which led Picasso at the height of his success to abandon his first realistic and incisive manner, derived from Goya, Greco and his master Toulouse-Lautrec, read André Salmon ("La Jeune Peinture Francaise," Messein, 1912). [Author's Note.]

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excitation of our sensibilities since the close of the eighteenth century, every art tends to become a universe in itself. Music becomes painting and poetry, painting becomes music. To protest in the name of the eternal essence of art is futile. No one has the right to speak for eternity. But when we see certain currents of thought affirm themselves for more than a century, we must bow before them as before the unchaining of great natural forces. Nature knows better than we what she desires. She has her laws. Let us learn to recognize them.

Now the law which has dominated painting for more than a century is a more and more comprehensive assimilation of musical idiom. Even Delacroix spoke of "the mysterious effects of line and color which, alas, only a few adepts feel—like interwoven themes in music . . ." and Baudelaire, in another connection, wrote, "Harmony, melody and counterpoint are to be found in color." Ingres also remarked to his disciples, "If I could make you all musicians you would be better painters." Renoir, who journeyed to Sicily to paint Wagner's portrait and to translate Tannhäuser, is a musical enthusiast and his work is music. Maurice Denis tells us that his pals at Julian's Academy, those who were to found synthesism with him, never tired of discussing Lamoureux's concerts, where they were enthusiastic habitués. Gaugin announced that "painting is in a musical phase." He speaks continually of the music of a picture; when he wants to analyze his work he divides it into the literary element, to which he attaches less importance, and the musical element which he schemes first. Cezanne, whom Gaugin compared to Cesar Franck, said "not model, but modulate." Metzinger invokes the right of cubist painters to express all emotions as music does, and one of the aestheticians of the new school writes: "The goal of painting is perhaps a music of nature, visual music to which traditional painting would have somewhat the status that sacred or dramatic music has compared to concert music."

This, then, is the revolution in the art of line and color which has become aware of its intrinsic power, independent of any subject. In truth, even among the Venetians, as has been well said, the subject was "only the background upon which the painter relied to develop his harmonies," but the mentality of spectators clings to this background as to the libretto of an opera. At present, an end to librettos: Pure music: those who wish to comprehend it must first of all master its idiom, for "Color is learned as music is."

Learn to see. Do not be too eager to impose your vision upon painters. If you wish to appraise artists with any justice, begin by attempting to share their vision. I do not mean that you ought to renounce your own vision in order to espouse another's. By no means; instead, be tolerant, respect the convictions of others, don't treat them off-hand as the pranks of fools or humbugs. Above all, if you have never occupied yourself with either painting or music, do not imagine that you can give lessons in the technique of harmony to men who have made it their vocation. If a body is inaccurately drawn it is quite probable that the artist is as well aware of it as you, and that he has his reasons, decorative or expressive. It is not enough for you merely to add your sneers to those of men steeped in artistic erudition. Remember Delacroix, the victim of the erudition of his time, to whom the Goncourts even in 1855 denied "the supreme quality of color, harmony!" Remember the Salon jury of 1863 which refused Corot, Cazin, Whistler, Manet, Pissarro, Fantin-Latour, Bracquemond, Harpignies, J. P. Laurens. Think of the riots caused by Manet's pictures, of great impressionists reduced to starvation, of Renoir stuffing his pockets with bread to take to Monet on the days that he dined with his mother, of the times, not so far distant, when Renoir's pictures sold for fifty or sixty francs, and finally of Van Gogh who in all his life was never able to sell a single canvas.

What does that establish? Is scepticism the only alternative? By no means. No one asks you to admire what you cannot understand. But do not disparage it or deny its right to existence. "But," you reply, "among the misunderstood there will always be mediocrites, schemers who make capital of the fact." What of it? The damage done is not great. And let me add, they will benefit less than if, in deriding them, you bawl their names until the echoes reverberate. The very name "impressionism" was invented by a hostile mob which used it as an insult, and that insult remains in history as a title of nobility.

Let us try to understand others. We shall not waste our time. Though the efforts of synthesism or cubism end in the grotesque or even in nullity, nevertheless we shall have learned much from the thoughts which inspired them. And let us add that a fairly widespread intellectual movement, though it be madness, has a profound and almost sacred significance. Primitive races believe that madmen are the voice of God. As much might be said of artists. Their madness is often wiser than the average wisdom.

Yet to say that these painters are entirely impulsive, guided by instinct alone, is wide of the mark. On the contrary, I know of no artistic period in which artists have meditated more profoundly upon the nature of their art. And if you are willing to read a few of their expositions, your apprehensions will in all probability be dissipated. Delacroix's journal, Signac's exposition of neo-impres-

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sionistic doctrines, the Tahitian stories by Gaugin, Van Gogh's letters, the volume "Theories" which Maurice Denis has just published, the study which two cubist painters, Gleize and Metzinger, have recently devoted to their school, and the notes of Thiesson and Ardengo Soffici, evince a varied culture and at times intuitions well in advance of those of literary men.

ROMAIN ROLLAND.

(*Chronique Parisienne, Bibliothèque Universelle et Revue Suisse, January, 1913.*)

Translated by LEE SIMONSON.

Revivalism

THE revival of religion now going on in Europe differs greatly both in character and in significance from the revivalism which Billy Sunday just now typifies so extravagantly. The one is a striking manifestation of the religious undercurrents in the human mind, the other tends to become a species of press-agenting for which the Almighty may or may not be thankful. It would not be fair, however, to judge American revivalism entirely from the exuberant personality of Billy Sunday. A certain amount of revivalism, whatever its spiritual depth may be, has long been normal to American life, and its recurrence furnishes an invaluable aid to the interpretation of our state of culture. Whereas the European revival is intimately related to the war, such local revivals as we had during the past winter certainly gained their impetus long before last August and have not been seriously influenced by the war.

For with us revivals are the inevitable outcome of the tradition of repression as we have inherited it largely from New England, and their persistence bears eloquent witness to the failure of that repression. Religious intolerance, having successfully smothered every sensuous and emotional outlet, finally created a condition where religion herself was compelled to provide such an outlet. Our revivals are nothing but the explosive release of certain tabooed sensuous emotions upon which the religious conscience habitually frowns. They are decidedly histrionic, and the self-exhibitionism, the shouting and dancing, the general breakdown of ordinary behavior codes, all point to their ecstatic origin and mark them as occasions when the usually impermissible acquires momentary sanction. In all this religion may be said to provide its own safety valve, and revivals become psychologically justified as kathartic agents; they correspond, with obvious modifications, to the "Mysteries" of ancient cults. But they are nevertheless renewed proofs of the inadequacy of a purely religious "Weltanschauung" to account for the nature of man.

The characteristic of American revivals that impresses us most is their essential staleness. They show very little real quickening of the religious genius. For they resolve themselves into a mere re-manipulation of the outworn paraphernalia of Christian exhortation, a reassertion of the eternal verities of sin, hell and salvation. It is to these standards that we are asked to rally. Revivals of this sort constantly create themselves with every alternate turn of the vicious circle of repression and distorted expression. They are as predicable as the panics of an unsound economic system. They are not so much a revival of religion as a re-vamping of it. From a purely religious point of view they must be a melancholy spectacle. For they are the signs, not of a growth, but of a bankruptcy and a desperation. Each revival, far from strengthening religion, leaves it only more exhausted. Some uneasy sense of this seems to be present to those ministers who, after much debate or denunciation, end by endorsing revivals and set about to vie with their flamboyancy. They act like reputable business men who, with a declining trade, finally succumb to advertising methods of which they cannot altogether approve. To the melancholy of the spectacle they add a touch of ignominy.

The European revival moves on an altogether different level. It is a much more primitive reaction, more truly indicative of the underlying religious impulses of man. If the ordinary revival were our only guide we should have to come to the somewhat strange conclusion that religion began with post-Pauline Christianity. The European revival, on the contrary, reminds us that religion is older than any human record and deeper than our conventionalized hell. It is both Christian and pagan and taps the very roots and prehistoric origins of religion.

Most striking, perhaps, is the sudden return to tribal deities. Last August the European firmament suddenly became populated with a number of fierce, revengeful tribal deities leading their respective adherents to assured victories. The implied polytheism is none the less real because a rationalizing theology may seek to explain it as different aspects of the same monotheism. Evidently the common impartial, pacifist God could not be relied upon to espouse the right side. To-day there undoubtedly exist a German, a French, a Belgian, a Russian and an English God, each claimed exclusively by his followers. This attitude is apparent not only in the mature, whom we might expect to be more philosophic, but even in the formative re-

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ligious feeling of the growing generation. I know of a charming child of French extraction, that after making its usual childish behests to God, was overheard exhorting him, quite spontaneously, to kill "ces sales Prussiens." Thus we have a revival whose first effect is to cause a regression of religious feeling to primitive and archaic conceptions which have long been recognized as inferior in the evolution of religion. In view of the fact that Germany, the most militaristic of the states involved, is most strident in its glorification of "Unser Gott," we may say that one of the effects of war is a deterioration of religion. A low form of religion is a kind of military necessity.

This reaction has been emotionally fostered by the sudden, overwhelming sense of the propinquity of death such as is now present to literally millions of Europeans. A French priest engaged in comforting the wounded is reported to have said that on the battlefield there are no unbelievers. We may accept his word without scoffing at the obviousness of the conversion. It is hard to die without some consolation, and the intellectual fortitude necessary to face oblivion is apt to be undermined when the life blood has flowed out of a man. Death, especially when it is so omnipresent, always enkindles an interest in that vague somewhere whence man still loves to believe that he has come. But these death-bed conversions again hardly represent a quickening of religious impulse. Their epidemic quality points to their ancient origin in the fear of the unknown, and shows that men still tend to return to the tutelage of psychic phantasies which, though they lie below the threshold of consciousness, are still active to undo the labored work of our reason.

Both the resurrection of tribal deities and of the naïve faith in immortality take us back to the earliest function of religion. Psychologically a formidable enemy acts like the hostile forces of nature and the terrifying forms of the imagination against which primitive man sought to protect himself by conceiving a guardian deity. But great though our emotional débâcle may be we cannot long believe in the magic of a god to protect us against a stronger foe. And useful though the consolation of immortality may be to lead men into battle, our sense of life is far too healthy for us to tolerate the perversity of religious feeling which places all fine values in the after-life. So that a religion revived on the appeal of a protection against death or a consolation for it is a religion which does not realize that it has outworn itself.

If we still say that the European revival is a genuine revival, this survey of it gives us at least an insight into the genesis of such movements. Revivals rarely arise in the church, where religion is always inevitably already somewhat formalized, but out of a dimmer, less articulate religious consciousness that lies beyond any church. They come from below, not from above, and pay no heed to our aesthetic or rationalistic prejudices. They are not an ordered progress but rather a chaos of archaic and even atavistic religious attitudes which the best religious thought has already discarded. They are man's first emotional, instinctive response to wars, earthquakes, floods, epidemics and other portentous cataclysms which still afflict him. They can be met and opposed only by whatever intellectual progress has been made in the interim. But their danger lies in that they come when reason and understanding are themselves stunned and bewildered by the surpassing horror of events.

This reactionary tendency of revivals is rarely acknowledged. Already one hears on all sides of the great religious awakening that has come about through the war. Religious leaders now quite generally speak of the war as a blessing in disguise. Happiness and human welfare have again been found out as the enemies of religion, and wars and earthquakes are hailed as essential to keep religious responsiveness at its proper pitch. Preachers, like bankruptcy receivers, do not thrive under prosperity. They are perhaps right in their suspicion of any religion whose fervor is derived mainly from a feeling of thanksgiving. For that fervor is too dependent upon the contrast of calamities escaped or for a time endured. When that contrast fades the fervor is altogether too likely to abate. Thus our own Thanksgiving Day, originally a purely religious holiday, has degenerated into a mere excuse for conviviality. But it becomes a destructive criticism to acknowledge that religion depends upon a violent opposition to happiness.

The survey of religious feeling in Europe invites to prophecy. If we strictly follow the analogy of tribal religions we may forecast that the vanquished in the present conflict, naïvely disappointed in their chosen gods, will discard them in favor of the conqueror's deity and thus rehabilitate monotheism. Some, too deeply disappointed, will discard all deities, deluding themselves into the belief that they have escaped from the thraldom of religion by becoming embittered atheists. It is worth while in this connection to remark that atheism is a comparatively recent intellectual achievement in the history of thought. Hardly until the Greek era did it occur to man that there might be no gods. Up to then it had always been a matter of choosing the wrong gods. But the twilight of religion is not yet likely to be complete. For it must be remembered that an unpar-

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alleled wretchedness and desolation is now settling upon millions of Europeans. From this common woe Christianity, which has always been deeply rooted in a primitive Ebionism, will undoubtedly derive a new impetus. While there is as yet no scientific and economic solution for poverty, amid conditions that have given that problem its severest setback, religion, to some extent at least, still assuages and consoles. But out of this crisis there will also arise more stalwart spirits who will realize that life, hard and bitter though it may be, is a reality which must be faced with such resources as we may have at our command.

ALFRED KUTTNER.

British Failure

IN the larger sense thare have been two great crises in the present war. The third is that which is incident to the German success in the Polish campaign now culminating about Warsaw.

The first crisis was plainly at the Marne. Could Germany there have obtained the decision she sought, her supremacy on the Continent for years would have been almost inevitable. She failed because in the last ditch the French outfought their foes, outgeneraled them, and flung them back upon the lines from which they have never been able to advance. Such advantage as the Germans won over the French in the opening campaign—the advantage which is revealed in the German occupation of the northeastern departments—was due to the fact that Germany delivered a blow under the belt, her Belgium blow. What she won she won by cheating, and even here was unable to retain more than half of the profit.

France thus had performed her part. It was Russia's turn next. From the Battle of the Marne to that of the Carpathians the Russian effort was the main circumstance in the European conflict. Germany had failed to destroy France; meantime Russia was steadily grinding up and breaking down Austrian resistance.

In March Przemysl had fallen and the Russian army was making its final bid for a decision along the Carpathians. If it were successful, Austria was out of the war. But there was one circumstance which was all-important: England had been unable to bring up many corps at the opening of the war. Her handful of men had fought bravely, but they had been only an incident at the Marne, a heroic detail in Flanders. The world expected, as did the British public, that in the spring Kitchener would have a million men in Flanders and a great Allied offensive would mark the beginning of the end of German possession in France and Belgium. If Britain were ready with a million it was plain that Germany would be unable to organize any offensive campaign in the east. French "nibblings" had shown that the German lines in France were exceedingly thin, and their reserves barely adequate to meet French attack alone. Over half a million newly trained German troops were now to come from the training camps. They would be sufficient, presumably, to restore the balance in the west, but they would have to be sent there.

Here was the second crisis. The Allies were in their best position since the war began. The Balkans were daily turning a friendlier attention to the words of Allied diplomatists. Italy was committed to enlist. For the first time there was an actual prospect of a decision for the Allies, a victory over Austria which would mean the ruin of the Hapsburg fortunes, or at least would make such demands upon Hohenzollern attention as to recall troops from France and compel shortening the line.

But the closing scenes of the Warsaw episode demonstrate how completely the chance was lost, and the present collapse of British effort supplies the reason. Instead of a million men Kitchener's army did not in April exceed 400,000. Instead of a spring drive there was the humiliating British reverse about Ypres. Before they finally sent their masses to the east the Germans made one experiment in the west. This experiment was the second battle of Ypres, and it proved that the British, so far from being ready to attack, could only hold on with difficulty and with local losses of territory.

After that revelation the German high command had no more misgivings. All their new troops, a few more formations from the west, were sent to Mackensen and Hindenburg. What troops were left in the west were exactly proportioned to the requirements of French offensive. The British were no longer a force to be reckoned with on the offensive. The Germans made their calculations on the basis of a conviction that Russia could be overwhelmed before the British could materially improve their situation.

The calculation was wholly correct. When the German campaign in Galicia was begun, the French

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gathered from their diminishing supply of reserves sufficient strength to release five or six army corps of the first line and made a desperate effort to break the German lines about Lens. The mission of the British in this operation was simply to contain the Germans on their front and prevent their sending troops to support their fellows about Lens. To do this the British undertook a demonstration about La Bassée. In three hours they lost 15,000 men, their ammunition gave out, and their demonstration was over.

As for the French, they took the Lorette heights, they straightened out the Carency salient. But they did not get to Lens because the Germans were able to bring down troops from the British front and undertake a new counter-offensive which won back Souchez. The effort to relieve the pressure upon the Russians had failed. The Germans say it cost the French 75,000 men. Once more it was demonstrated that the French could not, because of their tremendous losses, break the German lines without British help, and that British help was lacking.

It is necessary to look also at the Dardanelles operation. If the German forces could not be held in the west by British troops, there was a good chance in February and March that the forcing of the Dardanelles would permit the munitioning of the Russians and the equipping of more corps, trained and lacking only arms. Munitioned Russia might hope to hold back the German avalanche even if it were set in motion against her. But the campaign against the Turks failed; that is, it failed in so far as it was designed to munition Russia and save her from disaster when Germany should strike.

Unmistakably the Warsaw campaign is chargeable to British failure. The fact that the British were unable to get a large army into Flanders, the additional circumstance that they were unable to provide munitions sufficient to allow the army in Flanders to give indirect help to the gallant and desperate effort of the French to relieve the pressure upon their allies, finally the blundering delay at the Dardanelles—these are the underlying causes of the disaster which has taken place along the Vistula, and they have put an end to the great Russian attempt which only four months ago seemed to have every prospect of success.

It is but just to recognize the claim of the British that the part their navy has played in the war has been incalculable. It is fair to grant that they have played a considerable and an honorable part on land. But all these considerations are beside the main point, which is that all chance of an Allied triumph in 1915 was abolished by the failure to bring to the Continent that army which the world had expected and the British press had promised. The expectation may have been unwarranted, the promises were certainly unofficial, but the fact is unmistakable.

More than this, it seems fair to conclude that until the British do get their million or million and a half of troops on the Continent, there is hardly any prospect of material change in the battle line in the west. Behind the Niemen and the Bug the Russian armies will recuperate and reorganize, unless the Warsaw campaign ends in a Sedan. But the Germans are now free to turn to the Italian problem or seek to hack a way through Serbia toward the Dardanelles. Rumania, Greece and Bulgaria are unlikely to join the Allies in the present weather.

As to the French, they have lost above a million and a half of their best troops. With what remains they have to hold a line which amounts to nine-tenths of the western front. They still have reserves, but since the main shock of German attack must be met by them, they cannot venture to waste these reserves in costly offensives. Attrition is the most serious problem they have to consider, and it is most serious because they have the fortunes of the whole cause in the war mainly on their hands, now that Russia has been compelled to go back.

Not until England can put an army in the field large enough to free many French corps now holding the front, not until the British are munitioned for days of conflict instead of hours, can the French risk any grand offensive or hope for great success from any effort, however considerable and costly. Their army is in splendid condition, admirably led, perfectly equipped. But the task of freeing France and Belgium while German numbers remain as great as they now are is beyond its capacity.

In America it is natural that our impressions should come largely from British sources, and the part of the British in the war has been enormously exaggerated by the picturesque but ridiculous reports of the rôle of the British expeditionary army in the Marne campaign. The plain truth is that the British have so far failed to get an army to the Continent adequate either in numbers or munitions to Allied necessities. The failure is still complete a year after the beginning of the war, and the disastrous consequences of the failure have been the recent triumph of the Germans in Poland and their continued occupation of France and Belgium.

Warsaw is merely the culminating point in British failure, nowhere more plainly recognized than in Petrograd, Paris and London, nowhere more carefully considered than in Berlin. The question of when England can get up her army remains problematical. The outlook is not over-promising, but it is at least fairly apparent that until this army does get up, the hope of Allied victory may be dismissed; and Italy may be the next nation to suffer.

FRANK H. SIMONDS.

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Our Next Tariff

AMONG the many epochal consequences of the European war one of the most important will be a thoroughgoing revision of the tariff policies of the great Powers. Postponed, alas, to an indefinitely distant future is that darling dream of the Cobdenites, a dream of nations all at peace, each specializing in the production of the commodities for which it is best fitted by nature and exchanging them freely in every quarter of the globe. At the conclusion of hostilities free-trade England herself will scarcely desire to trade freely with Germany. Doubtless she will seek to realize as speedily as possible the preferential tariff projects of the late Mr. Chamberlain. And behind the new tariff walls to be erected by all the other nations now at war there will inevitably be much of the bitterness of a boycott.

From this vengeful spirit the United States, it is to be hoped, may remain free. Nevertheless, we must soon undertake a very considerable readjustment of our protective system to bring it into line with sweeping economic changes. Virtually every chemical industry in the United States is being expanded with feverish haste to meet the shortages caused by war. Benzine, toluene, xylene, and phenol are in tremendous demand. Enormous quantities of creosote oil are being produced for the impregnation of timber. The output of paper, including so-called Bible or India paper and certain high-grade printing papers, is increasing rapidly. Owing to the exclusion of the Swedish supply the same is true of the production of wood pulp. To this list should be added chemical glassware; fine glasses used in the manufacture of lenses for microscopes, telescopes, and range-finders; glass intended for tableware and mirrors; porcelain ware and iron enamel ware used for cooking and other household purposes. The machine and shipbuilding industries have been enormously stimulated. In districts where explosives are manufactured, conditions exist that have had no parallel since the days of mining booms in the far west. Some satisfaction may be extracted from the fact that we are no more ready with bane than with antidote. The American output of anti-toxins, serums, sanitary supplies, anaesthetics and the like, is increasing *pari passu* with the output of war munitions.

A part of this production is clearly abnormal in that it is due only to the military needs of the moment. When such demands fall off, the world may well rejoice. If the United States decides upon a policy of preparedness, however, it will have to consider with the utmost care measures designed to keep alive and to promote upon its own territory the manufacture of explosives and munitions of war. On the other hand, although called forth by war the greater part of our new industrial development is essentially pacific in character. If we permit the capital thus invested to be wiped out by foreign competition after peace is declared we will suffer bankruptcies perhaps sufficient in number and extent to cause a panic. And in case of future wars we will again be exposed to costly and humiliating economic losses similar to those which the dye-stuff shortage recently inflicted upon our textile industry. So far as increases of protective duities can be employed to safeguard us against such calamities, they should clearly be granted. Other forms of governmental support, for example, experimental laboratories, and in extreme cases even subsidies, may become necessary. Exhaustive attention should be given to scientific and technical methods, requisite to the production upon American territory of all raw materials essential to the processes of our fundamental industries. In a word the goal of our economic policy must be the greatest possible degree of national self-sufficiency.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the only real foes to the future rational development of protectionism in the United States are the protectionists themselves. Always their argument has been that a high tariff makes prosperity, employment, higher wages. In Pennsylvania and other great industrial sections of the country this doctrine, thanks to everlasting repetition, probably has more sincere believers than all the churches put together. Economists, on the other hand, have never ceased to laugh at such beliefs as mere campaign claptrap. And back of the political opposition to protectionism is the persistent conviction that in purpose and effect it has been class legislation. Tariff reformers have always denounced it as a system drawn primarily in the interest of the employer and profiteer, with the wage-earner callously left to shift for himself after performing his part, namely, that of depositing a safe and sane vote at all congressional and presidential elections.

The academic question as to whether high tariffs *per se* raise wages may be left to the theorists. Whatever their decision, it is beyond dispute that all the progressive governments of the world have been engaged for some time past in developing a large administrative technique for the improvement of working-class conditions. Germany has advanced

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far along the lines of imperialistic paternalism; under the Liberal party England's progress in social politics has been amazing; in America the "social justice" idea arrived nationally in 1912, and is now moulding the more important legislative projects in many of our states. Why should a new and enlightened protectionism not take advantage of these developments by adopting them as part and parcel of the tariff argument?

To illustrate: let us assume that the representative heads of a great industry appear before the Committee on Ways and Means (or before a Tariff Commission if the future grants us this boon) to ask for a specified increase in customs duties. After listening benevolently to the recital by these business men of their present hardships and their hopes of betterment under higher protection, why should the chairman not ask them for a definite statement of the ameliorations which increased tariff rates would enable them to make in the condition of their employees? The appearance at this juncture before the committee of representative workers invited from every branch of the industry under consideration would give a desirable concreteness to the discussion. In the end the grant of higher duties could be made conditional upon definite minimum wage standards, or at least the establishment of regional wage boards empowered to determine minimum wages. Similarly, certain standards regarding hours of labor, workmen's compensation, arbitration of industrial disputes, safeguarding dangerous machinery, and the like, might be stipulated. Women workers could be guaranteed conditions of labor that would preserve them for their future functions as wives and mothers. There would seem to be no reason whatever for the employment of children of tender years in industries enjoying the special favors of government, and any industry which sought higher tariff rates without cleansing its hands in this regard, or pledging such a cleansing within a short period, should be forced out of the committee room without ceremony.

The foregoing sketch merely outlines the sort of agreement that might be found desirable between employers and employees in a given industry seeking higher tariff rates. Undoubtedly many employers, especially those in the more progressive states, would find themselves well above the minima fixed in such agreements. It would, however, be necessary for the industrial "twentieth mean men" to bring the conditions of their workers up to the standards set. Possibly these agreements could be given the force of law under the interstate commerce clause. Or inspection to insure the same administrative results could be placed in the hands of the Secretary of Labor, with the power of recommending to Congress the withdrawal of the tariff increase in case of failure to maintain guarantees on the part of any of the employers. Similarly the interest of consumers might be safeguarded by requiring the Secretary of Commerce to investigate and report upon all undue increases in the price of protected commodities. In this connection the "new protection" idea first enacted into law by the Australian Commonwealth Parliament of 1906 is of interest. It provides for excise duties on domestic manufactures to accompany increased protective duties in their favor. If manufacturers charged too much for their product they ran the risk of a reduction of the protective duties; if they paid their employees standard wages the excise duties were rebated to them.

Under these conditions certain interests which in the past have been most clamorous for higher duties might manifest an invincible reluctance against taking a new appeal to Washington. So much the better, for they would thereby make plain that for them protection was merely a means to a narrow and selfish end.

If the Democratic party is ever to free itself from the sectional color given it by the solid South it must be by some such nationalizing and socializing treatment of the tariff issue. And the South itself, with its unsold stock of cotton, is perhaps sore enough to consider a revision of its traditional attitude on protection. Only by an entering wedge of this character can the Democracy ever hope to be anything more than a weak party of protest in Pennsylvania and other industrial sections of the North. One can imagine the amazement with which such a change of Democratic policy would be received by the rock-ribbed Republican protectionist school. At one blow it would deprive them of their most cherished brand of campaign thunder, and, bitterest of all, force them to make real instead of sham pledges to their workingmen of benefits to accrue from tariff increases.

So far as the future can be foreseen, the system of protection is certain to be continued in the United States. It will survive not because the abstract economic argument is in its favor, for this is doubtful at best, but simply because political conditions render its survival imperative. There is grave danger that it may be continued for a time as an offensive special privilege, jealously guarded and often cynically abused by the employing classes. Wise friends of protectionism who desire to see the system perpetuated and at the same time set free from constant radical attack, will seek to transform it into a genuine agency of economic progress. To employ the homely language of the Progressives in the last campaign, the benefits of protectionism should be "passed round."

ROBERT C. BROOKS.

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VERSE

Winged Man

The moon, a sweeping scimitar, dipped in the stormy straits;
The dawn, a crimson cataract, burst through the eastern gates;
The cliffs were robed in scarlet, the sands were cinnabar,
Where first two men spread wings for flight and dared the hawk afar.

There stands the cunning workman, the crafty past all praise,
The man who chained the Minotaur, the man who built the Maze;
His young son is beside him, and the boy's face is a light,
A light of dawn and wonder and of valor infinite!

Their great vans beat the cloven air, like eagles they mount up,
Motes in the wine of morning, specks in a crystal cup;
And lest his wings should melt apace, old Daedalus flies low,
But Icarus beats up, beats up—he goes where lightnings go.

He cares no more for warnings, he rushes through the sky,
Braving the crags of ether, daring the gods on high;
Black 'gainst the crimson sunset, golden o'er cloudy snows,
With all adventure in his heart, the first winged man arose!

Dropping gold, dropping gold, where the mists of morning rolled,
On he kept his way undaunted, though his breaths were stabs of cold,
Through the mystery of dawning that no mortal may behold.

Now he shouts, now he sings in the rapture of his wings,
And his great heart burns intenser with the strength of his desire,
As he circles like a swallow, wheeling, flaming, gyre on gyre.

Gazing straight at the sun, half his pilgrimage is done;
And he staggers for a moment—hurries on—reels backward—swerves
In a rain of scattered feathers, as he falls in broken curves!

Icarus, Icarus, though the end is piteous,
Yet forever—yea, forever!—we shall see thee rising thus,
See the first immortal glory, not the ruin hideous.

You were Man: where you sped we shall follow; you have led!
Man, absurd, gigantic, eager for impossible romance,
Overthrowing all Hell's legions with one warped and broken lance!

On the highest steeps of space he shall have his dwelling place;
In those far, terrific regions where the cold comes down like death,
Gleams the red glint of his pinions, smokes the vapor of his breath.
Floating downward, very clear, still the echoes reach the ear
Of a little tune he whistles and a little song he sings,
Mounting, mounting still, triumphant, on his torn and broken wings!

STEPHEN VINCENT BENÉT.

Northern Summer

Yea, tell me of the northland, in the flush
Of summer, hard upon the white spring's heels!
These southern islands know not how she steals
Radiant with pity, through the frozen hush;
Gathering her emerald garments for the rush,
At all her hemlock altars first she kneels,
While every hill and vale her presence feels,
And strange, stirred tears from arctic mountains gush.
Pausing a little ere the oft-run race,
She waits the promised coming of the sun:
Light, wind and light! Then summer, leaping forth,
Unveils the dazzling glory of her face,
And down the ways already woo'd and won
She flashes through the forests of the north.

FREDERIKA PETERSON.

A Dinner-Table

It was a dinner-table; and the talk,
Except for you, would have been smooth and comfortable,
Revering money mostly and its whims.
But you were there, and danced around the table,
Light on your feet and laughing in the room,
And young and hard to follow.
They could not be your partners in that dance;
And they rebuked such manners in the world
And scored your faith with facts.
Yet all the time they watched a light that danced with you.

Darkness as old as time towered about you,
From aged crags the rocks fell down . . .
And yet you danced impetuous, a very fool of light,
The swift impatient partner of the sun.

WITTER BYNNER.

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Sea Coal

Swift like the tongues of lilies,
Striped Amaryllis
Thrusting out of cloven basalt.
Amber and chalcedony,
And the snapping of sand
On rocks
Glazed by the wind.

AMY LOWELL.

After a Storm

You walk under the ice trees.
They sway, and crackle,
And arch themselves splendidly
To deck your going.
The white sun flips them into color
Before you.
They are blue,
And mauve,
And emerald.
They are amber,
And jade,
And sardonyx.
They are silver fretted to flame
And startled to stillness,
Bunched, splintered, iridescent.
You walk under the ice trees
And the bright snow creaks as you step upon it.

My dogs leap about you,
And their barking strikes upon the air
Like hammer-strokes on hard metal.
You walk under the ice trees
But you are more dazzling than the ice flowers.
And the dogs' barking
Is not so loud to me as your quietness.

You walk under the ice trees
At ten o'clock in the morning.

AMY LOWELL.

An Abandoned Amusement Park

Little blue and red booths, like painted graves
In a happy cemetery.
Minarets from which the yellow has peeled,
Like worn, garish caps on the heads of old peasants.
(For have not the buildings below you the bent strength
of peasants?)
Walks half hidden by leaves, that seem
White arms covered with tattered brown silk.
You are all as an old man who is tired of laughing
And sleeps a bit.

MAXWELL BODENHEIM.

The Net

The net brings up, how long and languidly,
A million vivid quiverings of life,
Keen-finned and gleaming like a steely knife,
All colors—green and silver of the sea,
All forms of skill and eagerness to be;
They die and wither at the very breath
That sounds your pity of their lavish death,
While they are leaping star-like to be free;
They die and wither, but the aged sea,
Insane old salty womb of mystery,
Is pregnant with a million million more,
Whom she will suckle in her oozy floor,
Whom she will vomit on a heedless shore
As we were vomited in days of yore.

MAX EASTMAN.

The New Platonist

Circa 1640

Our loves as flowers fall to dust;
The noblest singing hath an end;
No man to his own soul may trust,
Nor to the kind arms of his friend;
Yet have I glimsped by lonely tree,
Bright baths of immortality.

My faultless teachers bid me fare
The cypress path of blood and tears,
Treading the thorny wold to where
The painful Cross of Christ appears;
'Twas on another, sunnier hill,
I met you first, my miracle.

The painted windows burn and flame
Up through the music-haunted air;
These were my gods—and then you came,
With flowers crowned and sun-kissed hair,
Making this northern river seem
Some laughter-girdled Grecian stream.

When the fierce foeman of our race
Marshals his lords of lust and pride,
You spring within a moment's space,
Full-armed and smiling to my side.
O golden heart! The love you gave me,
Alone has saved, and yet will save me.

Perchance we have no perfect city
Beyond the wrack of these our wars,
Till Death alone in sacred pity
Wash with long sleep our wounds and scars;
So much the more I praise in measure
The generous gods for you, my treasure.

CUTHBERT WRIGHT.

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A COMMUNICATION

Mr. Angell's New Kind of War

SIR: I have been interested to note the proposal by a man of Mr. Angell's prominence to internationalize "that virtual control of overseas trade of the world which England now exercises." His general purpose one must applaud; with his belief that war with either Germany or England would in no way obtain for the United States the privileges which the American government desires, every sane man must heartily concur; but the feasibility of his scheme for the internationalization of the control of the sea appears to me extremely dubious and the objections to it obvious and serious.

It seems patent that his scheme for dealing an indirect blow at Germany conceals rather badly a very direct blow at England. Under this specious guise of an international council controlling the overseas trade of the world with all countries except Germany, Mr. Angell proposes to strip England of her control of the seas. He does not even concede to her a preponderant voice in the new council; the United States would in fact be the leading member ("this control would center at first mainly in America"); in return for such a cession of England's present authority he urges no *quid pro quo* whatever, and does not even discuss the necessity of granting one to secure the cession itself. The willingness of England to abdicate, to place the protection of her interests in the hands of this world council of neutrals and allies, he assumes. But does not this scheme require England to cede to others that very control of the seas which she regards as the foundation of her national independence? Is it not this control at which the German fleet is aimed and which every effort of England has been made to insure beyond a peradventure? Must not its loss seem to Englishmen the very greatest possible blow (short of invasion) which a crushing defeat of the Allies by Germany might deal them? Moreover, is not this arbitrary exercise of authority by England, of which Mr. Angell writes, the very right which the English are supremely anxious to preserve? How, too, can it be really transferred to others while the English fleet outnumbers the fleets of its allies and all neutrals combined?

And yet Mr. Angell calmly treats as a practical proposition the cession of this control by England to an international council in which England would be outnumbered, and whose chief reason for existence would be to establish regulations designed to promote the welfare of neutral countries to an extent which England will not voluntarily countenance. Clearly, what England will grant to neutrals this machinery is not needed to obtain; what it is intended to secure is those privileges which England at present denies to the United States and other neutral states. Conceal it as you will, the whole object of this scheme is to obtain at present concessions which England declines to make, and to exercise in the future an authority which England has alone possessed in the past.

From our point of view this is unquestionably expedient because we have everything to gain from it and nothing to lose; the greater number of countries will also gain permanently; but they will as certainly gain at England's expense. What reason have we to suppose that England will be willing to make such a sacrifice? Barely a moment's thought will show that the unwillingness of England to make the very concessions now asked is the proof of her unwillingness to renounce the exercise of the authority by virtue of which she is able to decline them. Until England is ready to cooperate heartily in such a plan, I cannot believe that it is in any degree feasible or practicable. Beside this fundamental objection all others are secondary.

I may feel wrongly that Mr. Angell intends that the United States is to play the leading part in this international council, but I do not believe that the present belligerent and neutral states are more likely than England to acquiesce in our leadership or even in our playing a really prominent part. The truth is, and the Europeans will be quick enough to see it, that the United States, without merchant marine or a navy large enough to counterbalance those of England, France, and Japan, to say nothing of Germany, has everything to gain by this scheme and nothing of consequence to risk. We have no present privileges which are not voluntarily conceded to us by other nations; we do not at present imperil other nations' privileges secured for them by their own naval forces; anything which others yield to us, however small, will be a gain, for which we shall not give anything of equal value in return. Everyone else puts something into the pool and makes in theory some concession. We alone make and can make no concession which the Europeans would consider had cost us anything. It seems to me highly probable that if the United States should officially espouse such a scheme it would be viewed abroad as a masquerade of American interests in the specious garb of internationalism. Mr. Angell would of course reply that rights and interests are complementary and not exclusively the property of individual nations; that the idea that some give more than others is a delusion. This may be true; I do not accept it as a working proposition in practical international politics, because the statesmen of Europe as yet are united in their acceptance of the contrary belief.

Another objection, also fundamental and vital, lies in the fact that Mr. Angell's scheme leaves untouched what seems to me the real difficulty. How can an international council adopt and execute a resolution contrary to England's interests while the latter holds practically undisputed command of the sea and can nullify the council's action at pleasure? If the council cannot impose its will upon its own members, will it not be a solemn fiction, whose machinery of deliberation will ill mask its real impotence? I cannot believe that such a council would do more than transfer the disputes between the diplomatists at home to the diplomatists gathered in council; would do more than facilitate agreement upon minor matters, accelerate disagreement upon vital questions, and reveal in all their nakedness the fundamental difficulties which now hold nations apart. These lie in the fact that England does

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have control of the seas and that all other nations have something to gain from taking it away from her, and *per contra* that England has everything to lose by allowing them to do it; that nearly all neutral states, the United States in particular, are dependent upon the English merchant marine, English exchange, English insurance, for economic contact with three-fourths of the globe; that the geologic contour of the European coast, the ocean currents, and the position of the British Isles compel the commerce of the world with northern Europe to pass through the English Channel which England's harbors, for the same geologic reasons, control.

No machinery will change these facts or obviate their results. Indeed the issue is simply this: how can the many, who are weak, secure what they desire from the few, who are strong, when the latter do not believe it consonant with their own interests to yield. The many are really asking the strong to renounce privileges both agree to be valuable and important, which the many confess their inability to take from the strong by force. The strong have always declared that the many wished the results of force without the risk of employing it. If the strong were willing to concede these privileges to the weak, no new machinery would be needed to deliver them; until the strong are willing to concede them, nothing short of force can compel the strong to act contrary to their wills. I believe Mr. Angell to be right; the only effective method of remedying present problems is a new method of international thinking, the convincing the strong that what the weak desire is not only just but feasible without real cost to themselves, even if we do not go as far as Mr. Angell and claim that the strong will benefit more from their concessions to the weak than by their former selfishness. But I cannot agree with Mr. Angell that international councils or Hague tribunals will be of large consequence before this change in the international mind has been brought about. Such councils can only reflect opinions and interests. I believe that we have already all necessary machinery to enforce the international mind; it is the mind itself that is lacking, and I am not optimistic about the potency of mere machinery to create it. Time was when political machinery was thought all-sufficient to produce political reforms and even the social millennium. Let us pacifists and internationalists not fall into the same slough.

ROLAND G. USHER.

Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.

CORRESPONDENCE

A Georgian on Justice

SIR: I have read the editorial entitled "Leo Frank" in your issue of July twenty-fourth, and as a Georgian I cannot let what you have said go unchallenged.

Like many others outside of Georgia, you have formed an opinion of this case and expressed it in the strongest terms when you evidently know nothing whatever of the facts. You are doubtless unfamiliar with the laws and procedure in this state and you have not read the record in this case. I know these statements are true because your article proves them. Frank was convicted on competent and sufficient evidence. Men have been executed in every part of this Union where capital punishment prevails on less testimony and weaker testimony than was had against Frank. No crime was ever committed in any state that will surpass in its criminal details the inexcusable murder of Frank's victim, and yet you try to hold up to the scorn and contempt of the world all the people of a great state because its weaker citizens were indignant. I do not approve of violence at any time or under any circumstances, but if poor, ignorant working men are ever justified in losing their heads, full justification may be found in the harrowing recital of how Mary Phagan died.

We have some indication of a mob spirit in this state, just as you have in New York and just such as will be found in any other state. You condemn our mob spirit without justifying your own, while your written condemnation breathes the true spirit of the mob. Your article strikes at the foundations of organized government and is nothing short of the rankest sort of mob spirit. You condemn a great state and all the good people in it because of a lawless element that will be found in every community of every state, and you do this in your supreme ignorance, the same ignorance and haste and want of deliberation that prompts the mob everywhere. You must know that some of the most damaging evidence against Frank was unprintable, and can be found nowhere outside the record in the case.

The good people of Georgia, and they are greatly in the majority, do not condone the attack on Frank by a fellow prisoner said by many to be of unsound mind, because one murder cannot justify another; but they realize that this might easily have happened anywhere. They do believe very largely, however, that Frank is guilty, and this belief is built on first-hand knowledge of the crime, while your opinion so violently expressed is a mere guess, or else the result of passion or prejudice. And yet in your egotistic complacence and astounding ignorance of this case, you assume that you are right and that all the people of this state, all its courts, and all its officials who know the facts are wrong. May the gods look with pity on your own stupidity.

Georgia has sought in the conviction of Frank to redress a monumental wrong, a crime against an innocent working girl, committed by a fiend, and in so endeavoring to preserve her laws and sustain them and keep them, she is unashamed and unafraid. Georgia stands to-day where she has always stood, the friend of the poor and helpless, the preserver of law and order, and the advocate of good government, and if this record makes her the "black sheep" of the American commonwealth, may the Lord have mercy on the rest of the flock.

D. M. PARKER.

Baxley, Ga.

[EDITORS' NOTE.—Two Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have stated that Leo Frank did not have a fair trial.]

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Books and Things

THE other night I sat up late reading one of those books on politics which are regarded as essential to any sort of intellectual respectability. It was a book that might be referred to in the Constitutional Convention at Albany. As I read along I was possessed with two convictions about the author. The first was that he had worn a high hat when he wrote the book; the second, that he had no teeth, which made him a little difficult to understand. And all through that hot and mosquito-ridden night the disintegration of his vocabulary went churning through my head . . . "social consciousness . . . sovereign will . . . electoral duties . . . national obligations . . . on moral, economic, political, and social grounds . . . social consciousness . . . sovereignty . . . electoral . . . social . . . sovereign . . . national . . . sovereign . . ." Each word was as smooth and hard and round as a billiard-ball, and in the malice of my sleeplessness I saw the toothless but perfectly groomed man in a high hat making patterns of the balls which were handed to him by his butler.

As the night dragged along, the callowest prejudices came to the surface and all fairer and reputable judgment deserted me. I heard myself say that this ass who plagued me couldn't possibly have any ideas because he didn't have any vocabulary. How is it possible, I asked, to write or think about the modern world with a set of words which were inchoate lumps when Edmund Burke used them? Political writing is asphyxiated by the staleness of its language. We are living in a strange world, and we have to talk about it in a kind of algebra. And of course if we deal only with colorless and vacant symbols, the world we see and the world we describe soon becomes a colorless and vacant place. Nobody can write criticism of American politics if the only instruments at his command are a few polysyllables of Greek and Latin origin. You can't put Bryan and Hearst and Billy Sunday into the vocabulary of Aristotle, Bentham, or Burke. Yet if you are going to write about American politics, can you leave out Bryan and Hearst and Billy Sunday, or even Champ Clark? The author I had been reading did leave them out completely. He talked about the national will of America as if it were a single stream of pure water which ran its course through silver pipes laid down by the Constitutional Fathers.

I tried to recall any new words which had been added to the vocabulary of social science. Boss, heeler, machine, log-rolling, pork-barrel—those were the words which meant something at Washington or in Tammany Hall, but my author would no more have used them than he would have eaten green peas with a knife. Anyone who did use them he would have regarded as a mere journalist, and probably a cocksure young man at that. Then I remembered that the diplomats had made current a few fresh words within the last generations—hinterland, pacific penetration, sphere of influence, sphere of legitimate aspiration; they had meaning, because nations went to war about them. But the real contributions, curiously enough, have come not from the political theorist, but from novelists, and from philosophers who might have been novelists.

H. G. Wells and William James, I said to myself, come nearer to having a vocabulary fit for political uses than any other writers of English. They write in terms which convey some of the curiosity and formlessness of modern life. Speech with them is pragmatic, and accurate in the true sense. They are exact when exactness is possible, and blurred when the thought itself is blurred. They have almost completely abandoned the apparatus of polysyllables through which no direct impression can ever penetrate. They do not arrange concepts, they gather percepts, and never do you lose the sense that the author is just a man trying to find out what he thinks. But the political writer who gave me the nightmare never admitted that he was just a man. He aimed at that impersonal truth which is like the inscription on monuments.

He regarded himself as a careful person. His method was to retrieve in qualifying clause whatever he had risked in assertion. So he achieved a compendium of things-that-can't-be-done, a kind of anthology of the impossible. His notion of getting at the truth was to peal it, like Peer Gynt's onion, though Peer Gynt had the sense to be surprised that there was nothing to an onion but the layers.

My temper grew worse as I reflected on the hypnotic effect of books done in this manner, on the number of men whose original vision is muffled by verbal red tape and officialism of the spirit. The true speech of man is idiomatic, if not of the earth and sky, than at least of the saloon and the bleachers. But no smelly or vivid impression can win its way through these opaque incantations with which political science is afflicted. They forbid fresh seeing. An innocence of the eye is impossible, for there are no words to report a vision with; and visions which cannot be expressed are not cultivated. No wonder, I thought, political philosophizing means so little in human life. Its woodenness is the counterpart of a wooden politics, its inhumanity is the inhumanity of a state machine. The language is callous, unmoved and unmoving, because it aims to reflect rather than to lead the life upon which it comments. Dead speech is good enough for thoughts that bring no news, and it is to the timidity of political thought that we must ascribe its preference for a dead language. In these tomes over which we yawn at night there are occasionally ideas which might shake the world. But they do not shake it, for they are written for people who do not like to shake it. They are hedged with reservations, fortified with polysyllables, and covered over with the appalling conceit that here is truth—objective, impersonal, cold.

I generalized rashly: That is what kills political writing, this absurd pretence that you are delivering a great utterance. You never do. You are just a puzzled man making notes about what you think. You are not building the Pantheon, then why act like a graven image? You are drawing sketches in the sand which the sea will wash away. What more is your book but your infinitesimal scratching, and who the devil are you to be grandiloquent and impersonal? The truth is you're afraid to be wrong. And so you put on these airs and use these established phrases, knowing that they will sound familiar and will be respected. But this fear of being wrong is a disease. You cover and qualify and elucidate, you speak vaguely, you mumble because you are afraid of the sound of your own voice. And then you apologize for your timidity by frowning learnedly on anyone who honestly regards thought as an adventure, who strikes ahead and takes his chances. You are like a man trying to be happy, like a man trying too hard to make a good mashie shot in golf. It can't be done by trying so hard to do it. Whatever truth you contribute to the world will be one lucky shot in a thousand misses. You cannot be right by holding your breath and taking precautions.

WALTER LIPPMANN.

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Law and Privilege

The Law and the Poor, by E. A. Parry. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. $2.50.

"THE rich have many law books written to protect their privileges, but the poor, who are the greater nation, have but few."

This, gentle reader, is not the utterance of one of our legal muckrakers, but the opening sentence of the book by His Honor Judge Parry, for over twenty years judge in English urban county courts. Judge Parry is peculiarly gifted with that rare imagination which enables him to see mortal men and women where others see cases, litigants or parties before the court. Hence the book is a rare document, especially useful as a corrective to the tendency to lose sight of actual living conditions in the logical pursuit of abstract legal doctrines.

A good part of the book deals with imprisonment for debt which the reading of the English statute-book leads one to suppose was abolished in 1869, but which we here learn still forms a deplorable factor in the social life of the poor in England, breaking up homes, and so on: imprisonment for debt, of course, affects only the poor; the rich man, aided by expert counsel, has the privilege, on payment of ten pounds, of filing a petition in bankruptcy and thus wiping out all his debts. Though some of the conditions treated in this connection fortunately no longer prevail in this country, the book may serve as a powerful antidote against that foolish complacency which supposes that equality before the law is an accomplished fact. The thesis that in the legal race "the poor man is the scratch-man, and the greater the wealth the larger the handicap" is made out in many fields. It is shown in a striking and suggestive way in the realm of divorce law where the relief that the court offers can be obtained only at a cost prohibitive to the poor. Not only has the one who can hire the better counsellor the greater chance in the legal lottery, but the whole machinery of appeal makes litigation a rich man's game. Unless the poor workman belongs to a union and his case is a test case, he stands little chance. The professional code of the "better-class" lawyers which discourages taking cases on contingency also militates against the poor man. As to the criminal law, all men may be equal once they are in the dock, "but one may harbor a suspicion whether all men have equal opportunity of getting there."

Unlike Dante's Inferno, our penal system punishes violence and brutality more than fraud and deceit, and yet "crimes of violence and brutality are naturally the crimes of the less fortunate of mankind" (p. 201), and while the law is old and decrepit, the modern well-to-do swindler is quite up to date. The imposition of fines means imprisonment for poverty, but freedom for those whose purses are long enough. It is only natural for judges to treat a kleptomaniac lady or derelict young man of "good family" with greater consideration. "The wrongdoing of a man or woman of our own class naturally appeals to our bump of forgiveness more readily than that of a slum-dweller whose temptation and environment we know nothing about" (p. 204). A judge is not a legal slot-machine, but a human being. "He has toddled about in the same nursery, learned in the same school . . . and lived in the same society as the rest of the middle classes" (p. 100).

The main trouble, however, is not with the judges but with "the old derelict laws made by slave-owners for slaves, by masters for serfs, by the landlords for the landless" (p. 18). If only there were a "lethal chamber" where laws could retire as soon as they had outlived their usefulness! Still it is true that most improvements in the law, giving the prisoner right of counsel, the right to testify, and the right of appeal, have had to be won against the opposition of the bench and bar.

The saloon problem is properly part of this book, since the alehouse, like the poorhouse, is for the poor only. The rich enjoy at their clubs or hotels privileges denied to their less prosperous brethren. In Germany "a workingman and his wife and children spend their evening listening to a band in a German beer-garden with as little sense of impropriety as Lord and Lady De Vere take their lunch at the Ritz" . . . but in England (and in the United States) the wife of a laborer "is looked upon as degraded if she joins him at the only place where he can spend his leisure, and the rich lawgivers put the true stamp on their own invention by enacting that it is an unfit place for little children to enter" (p. 262). "The first step you have to take is to convince the unenlightened puritan that the alehouse is, or ought to be, as worthy a public house as the church or the school" (p. 256).

The above account does little justice to the human and readable qualities of this book. The author, unlike most propagandists, has a real sense of humor, and his interpretations of biblical incidents are well worth remembering. "On Sunday we intone to slow music our desire to forgive our enemy his trespasses; on Monday we go down to our solicitor to issue a writ against him for the trespasses we have failed to forgive" (p. 306). Characteristic also is the following on the minimum wage. "If a man has a smoking chimney, or pollutes a river, or goes about in public with an infectious disease, we fine or imprison him for his anti-social misconduct. Surely a man who pursues an industry that does not make a living wage for the workers in it is equally an enemy of the people, to be dealt with as such by the law!" As to the "scientific" sociologists who are afraid that "if the law were to protect the fool the effect would be to increase and multiply the breed of fools, whereby the human race would become a bigger fool race than it already is," the reply is made "that the law as it now stands makes the trade of knavery such a lucrative one that the business of it is fast becoming overcrowded."

With all his radicalism Judge Parry is still, as he tells us, a member of the cultured upper classes, and he would not counsel any harsh or hasty action. His consolation is that it will all turn out right if we are willing to wait centuries rather than months. He shares the prevailing faith that nature is like a plumber that delays and sputters about his job but in the end somehow manages to have it done. His instances, however, do not always bear this out. Thus not only is the English law of divorce far behind the Roman, but the views of the Archbishop of York in 1912 are far behind those of Archbishop Cranmer of 1550. In the introduction, Judge Parry mentions a more encouraging incident. For many years as, is well known, Mr. Plimsoll carried on an agitation against the practice of the "ship-knackers, who bought up old unseaworthy vessels and sent them to sea overloaded and overinsured." It was only when in unparliamentary fashion he began to give the names of the parliamentary gentlemen engaged in the business of sending poor men to death that he was called to order, and made to leave the house, but his measure passed. Sometimes it is better not to wait for nature or the plumber but to tackle the job at once.

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An American-German

A German-American's Confession of Faith, by Kuno Francke. New York: B. W. Huebsch. 50 cents net.

WHEN a German-American refuses to identify himself with Teutonic partisanship in this country, it might be supposed that he harbors doubt as to the justice of Germany's cause. Such is not the position of Professor Kuno Francke, curator of the Harvard Germanic Museum. In the European struggle the sympathies of Professor Francke are "wholly and fervently" on the German side. But with all his desire for German victory, with all his recognition that American policy "practically turns out to the advantage of England and to the detriment of Germany," Professor Francke maintains the conviction that his duties as an American citizen preclude his working for German interests on this side.

If one comes to Professor Francke's "confession of faith" in the hope of a new view as to Germany in Europe, a considerable disappointment is in store. In this department of his confession the author is uncritically loyal. If the German military and bureaucratic class is overbearing, it is only the seamy side of "sterling rectitude and splendid efficiency." If there are traces of megalomania in Wagner and Emperor William, "there is no genius without a certain megalomania; and the true genius makes this very self-over-estimation an incentive for ceaseless self-discipline and self-denying devotion to work, and thereby rises to his own true self." Modern German development is inspiring to Professor Francke. With joy and gratitude he has beheld his country "striding ahead of the rest of the world." "A new idealism, a substantial enthusiasm for good government, for social justice, for beauty and joy, for fullness and richness of individual character, have accompanied it"; and he proclaims that "it is certainly not an accident that neither Syndicalism, so rampant both in France and England, nor Anarchism, the terror of Russian autocracy, has gained any foothold on German soil."

Holding these views, it is easy to see how Germany appears to him to have been the victim of a conspiracy, to have been throttled and isolated and checked and hemmed, how England appears to have been jealous and domineering, and eventually a criminal against a civilization which had outstripped her own.

But if these views leave one sceptical—and it is hard not to be sceptical of a writer who presents only the attractive side of a character so complicated as the Kaiser—the integrity of Kuno Francke's Americanism is all the more profound. Believing as he does that the popular feeling here is ignorant, wrong and shortsighted, it required great stability in him to think as an American at all. But that stability he possesses in a peculiar degree. It is as an American he views the harmfulness of a violent anti-English propaganda, and as an American he resists "nationalist animosities and sectarian strife" in our midst. He is willing to counsel the prohibition of the shipment of arms, but only as an American who wishes to retaliate on English encroachments on our trade, not as a German who wishes to cripple the Allies. If this makes him a "traitor" to Germany, he is willing to be a traitor. To him the real treachery is to forget what American citizenship demands.

One of the chapters in this little volume is devoted to the possibly ironic subject of the United States as peacemaker. In that chapter Professor Francke sees Germany and the United States agreed as to the freedom of the sea. Where he would stand in the controversy that has since arisen it is hard to guess, but there is a poignancy in his poem after the Lusitania which permits one to suspect that "Germania Martyr" would not be his last word.

One would be pusillanimous to receive this "confession of faith" in a critical spirit. Whether one agrees or disagrees as to the righteousness of Germany in the war, the virtue of Professor Francke's sense of obligation remains. A terrible choice is forced upon him. He might easily sophisticate it. He might easily abide by those inclinations of whose depth he gives such signs. He loves Germany. He believes in her. He aspires for her. In the face of this, and in the face of what seems to him popular stupidity and inadequacy, he is ready to see Germany injured rather than prejudice his duty to the country he adopted. It is a fine thing to possess such a faith.

Studies in Tone Poetry

Nature in Music, by Lawrence Gilman, New York: John Lane Company. $1.25 net.

MUSIC is perhaps the hardest thing in the world to write about. Words and tones do not lie kindly together. Music is so untranslateable a language that words, whether they are merged with the music, as in the song or opera, or whether they come as criticism and interpretation, always seem to be subjugated to the musical will and dragged in curious denuded fashion behind it. The singer follows a sound intuition when he distorts the vowels of his words in the interests of beautiful tone, thus implying that the words can be no more than the vaguest suggestions of a mood, and that the mood can only be caught through the sensuous totality of the poem.

It is equally precarious to use words as interpretation of music. For of all the arts this most closely fuses emotion and intellect, is the faithfullest transcript of life, the perfect pattern of the beautiful sensuous flux of things. Even the most poetical word is a slight arrest of this flux, cuts ever so slightly feeling from idea. No critic can ever do more than play desirously around music, like one who tries to streak his fingers with the sunset. The utmost he can do is to catch the same flaming mood that the music pours.

Mr. Gilman is one of the few writers on music who shows himself conscious of these limitations. Others write vivaciously or learnedly about musicians and musical works, but rarely about music. Perhaps only he and Daniel Gregory Mason are really readable in this country. Behind Mr. Mason's words looms a firm framework of harmony and form. His is sound and fleshy criticism, although at times his critical X-ray lets the anatomy divert us from the radiant charm of the spirit. Mr. Gilman is vaguer, but he gains in being vague. He has a rather rich body of poetic and philosophic allusion which he uses suggestively. He is not subjective, however, but seeks to relate his music to those other intuitions of the spirit with which music has more secret affinity than with any other experiences that can be put into words.

In his discussion of the musical nature-painting of the moderns I confess he seems to me to fuddle a little. When he says that MacDowell in his little tone-poems "exerts not only that inarticulate eloquence which belongs peculiarly to music, but also the concrete, precise and definite eloquence of the poet and the pictorial function of the painter," he of course poses the most fascinating problem of musical art. Mr. Gilman seems to stand sponsor for the conventional idea that the programmatic piece is "dependent for its full realization upon an element external

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to itself." But is not the dependence on the other side? Is it not the poetry and the nature which is parasitic? Does Mr. Gilman really think that anything essentially musical would be lost if MacDowell's pieces were published without titles and verses, or anything musical gained if the Brahms Intermezzi had them? Are not most of the Strauss symphonic poems heart-stirring and significant music without any synopsis at all? And is not the growing sense among music-lovers that Wagner means more in the concert than on the opera-stage the clinching proof of the falsity of the theory that such divine music needs word-poetry for "full realization?"

This is not to deny the charm of the poetry and title that accompanies most modern music. But it is never more than accompaniment. The poetry is an added exotic instrument to the orchestra, a certain suffused and colorful light playing on the entire musical scene. The "program" of program music is never really anything more than metaphor, and that only a metaphor of mood, not of movement or detail. The best modern music is so richly the very stuff of life itself, that the other arts can act only as illustration, and this only with a certain feebleness. It is impossible to believe that any true creative musician composes his work of "artistic symbols, which will express and fulfill the concept which the title or superscription of the piece has evoked." This is the crucial test of genius—whether the music itself dominates. In any creative musical art worthy of the name, the "symbol" is entirely the "title or superscription"; the symbol is not the music. What has really happened in modern music is that "extraordinary debauch" which the English critic D. S. MacColl eloquently describes, "in which the man who has never seen a battle, loved a woman, or worshipped a god, may not only ideally, but through the response of his nerves and pulses to immediate rhythmical attack, enjoy the ghosts of struggle, rapture and exaltation with a volume and intricacy, an anguish, a triumph, an irresponsibility, unheard of. An amplified pattern of action and emotion is given; each may fit to it what images he will."

This seems to me almost thrillingly exact. The title or verses of the program music are no more than the image which the composer has willed to fit to it. That this fitting has become so much the custom is not due to any new effort of creative musical art to mirror nature, as Mr. Gilman seems to think, but rather to the more poetical orientation of the modern musician, and to an intuitive response to the demands of an intensely curious but unmusical generation.

In spite of the fact that Mr. Gilman does not seem to have justified his position on program-music, his other essays show much sympathy and discernment. In his treatment of Strauss, Debussy, Grieg, Loeffler and MacDowell he often talks as if he believed in the stern primacy of the musical idea and mood. Particularly is this true of the essay on Loeffler, a really notable piece of interpretation. Mr. Gilman's repudiation of Grieg's "nationalism," and his emphasis on Debussy's clairvoyant imagination, really surrender his whole programmatic case. He could talk as he does only if he felt in his heart the fecundity and untranslatability of pure music.

That one feels a sense of frustration at not finding in the book the essays on Schoenberg and Wagner as a Lover which are promised on the cover is perhaps the best tribute to Mr. Gilman's writing. And if it is true that words applied to music can scarcely be other than an impertinence, Mr. Gilman makes them seem less an impertinence than almost any other American critic.

RANDOLPH S. BOURNE.

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History in Slang

The Rise of the Dutch Kingdom, by Hendrik Willem Van Loon. New York: Doubleday, Page and Company. $2.50 net.

THAT Mr. Van Loon learned to write history in a style which recalls a George Ade fable suggests unexpected versatilities in the Dutch character. Much of Mr. Van Loon's historical writing could scarcely have been produced except after a deep acquaintance with Broadway. There is a racy account of how the Dutch popular minority that "tried to make a noise like Jacobins" got snuffed out by "Coup d'Etat No. 1." "Messieurs," their enemies sent word to Paris, "compared with your own glorious revolutionists of sainted memory, even the most extreme Dutch Jacobins are like innocent lambs. The little plan which they have originated resembles more a Sunday school frolic than a real and genuine revolutionary coup." "All right," Paris reported back, "go ahead and try." And yet you've got to hand it to Mr. Van Loon. His musical-comedy account of the dull little republic is amusing. You get exactly the vivid and humorous impression that you would were you to see the characters step out of the quaint woodcuts with which the book is illustrated. You are present at innumerable scenes, as a sophisticated twentieth-century visitor who has just stepped off the train. This method of writing history has been practised by undergraduates in their history exams, but has scarcely affected professional historians. The book makes one recommend the method. But the method can scarcely be practised unless preparations are made for living abroad after publication.

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